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In the aftermath of September 11, "Americans have apparently
heeded the U.S. government's advice to prepare for terror attacks,
emptying hardware store shelves of duct tape."' Before rushing out to
buy duct tape, you should be forewarned that according to the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, duct tape is a
"tool of the narcotics trade."2 This means that a police officer expert
testifying for the prosecution may properly tell the jury that duct tape
"is often used 'by people in the drug world to bind hands, legs, and
mouths of people who are either being robbed in the drug world or
who need to be maintained."
3
Judges routinely admit expert testimony offered by prosecutors,
but frequently exclude expert testimony offered by the defense. A
review of federal criminal court cases reveals that 92% of prosecution
experts survive defense challenges, while only 33% of defense experts
survive challenges by federal prosecutors A recent study of federal
appellate criminal cases found that more than 95% of prosecutors'
experts are admitted at trial, while fewer than 8% of defense experts
are allowed to testify.'
1. Jeanne Meserve, Duct Tape Sales Rise Amid Terror Fears (Feb. 11, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/02/1 /emergencysupplies/ (last visited Oct. 14, 2004):
2. United States v. Moore, 104 E3d 377, 384 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (finding that this
opinion testimony was properly admitted because "[t]he fact that duct tape is a tool of the
narcotics trade is likely beyond the knowledge of the average juror but is relevant to the issue
of Moore's intent to distribute the drugs found in his possession").
3. Id
4. D. Michael Risinger, Navigating Expert Reliability: Are Criminal Standards of
Certainty Being Left on the Dock 64 ALB. L. REV. 99, 99 (2000). For a careful and detailed
discussion of why the "positivist" reliability standard created by Daubert v Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), has a disproportionately negative impact on
defense expert witnesses, see Christopher Slobogin, The Structure of Expertise in Criminal
Cases, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 105, 108-09 (2003).
5. See Risinger, supra note 4, at 109-10 (noting that his data reveal that "rarely has a
federal prosecutor had proffered expertise excluded on dependability grounds").
6. This recent study reviewed approximately 700 federal and state appellate criminal
court cases. See Jennifer L. Groscup et al., The Effects of Daubert on the Admissibility of
Expert Testimony in State andFederal Crminal Cases, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L. 339, 344
(2002).
At both adjudicative levels, experts proffered by the prosecution were more likely
to be admitted than experts proffered by defendants. At the trial court level,
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Why do judges consistently fail to scrutinize prosecution experts?
Maybe it is the uniform. The most common prosecution expert
witness is a police officer or a federal agent.8 In state and federal
criminal trials, law enforcement experts are routinely permitted to
testify to opinions and conclusions derived from their on-the-job
experience and personal observations.9 Prosecutors rely on police
officer experts most frequently in narcotics cases."° In drug cases, law
enforcement experts are often asked to interpret ambiguous words or
phrases used by the defendant and/or his coconspirators." The
purpose of, and problem with, this expert testimony is that it tells
jurors precisely which inculpatory inferences they should draw from
the factual evidence. 2
Cases from all of the federal circuits reveal that judges readily
accept prosecutors' empirically unsupported assumption that jurors
need police experts "to explain both the operations of drug dealers and
the meaning of coded conversations about drugs."'3 Defense attorneys
prosecution experts were admitted 95.8% ... of the time, and defendant-appellant
experts were admitted only 7.8% ... of the total number of times they were
offered. This pattern was slightly less pronounced at the appellate level, with
prosecution experts admitted 85.1% ... of the time and defense experts admitted
18.8%... of the total number of times they were offered.
Id at 369-70. However, data drawn from appellate cases should not be misconstrued. The
fact that the overwhelming number of criminal appeals are filed by defendants cautions
against drawing too many general conclusions about what happens at trial from empirical
research that is limited to the appellate courts.
7. Professors David L. Faigman and James E. Starrs have repeatedly criticized
courts for the lax standards they apply to prosecutors' law enforcement experts. See, e.g.,
Mark Hansen, Dr Cop on the Stand- Judges Accept Police OffIcers as Experts Too Quickly,
Citics Say, A.B.A. J., May 2002, at 31-32, 34. In this article, Professor Faigman describes
his disappointment at the fact that courts are generally willing to admit police officer expert
testimony despite the fact that they "have little research or data to support their opinions." Id
at 34. Professor Starrs expresses a similar view, observing that although judges are required
to exclude unreliable testimony, when police officers testify, unreliable evidence "kind of
slips in under the gatekeeper's door." Id.
8. See Groscup et al., supra note 6, at 345.
9. See id
10. See id
11. See id
12. See United States v. Garcia, 291 F3d 127, 142 (2d Cir. 2002) (noting that the
problem with opinion testimony explaining drug jargon is that it "direct[s] the jury what to
conclude on a matter that it should decide in the first instance").
13. United States v. Dukagjini, 326 F.3d 45, 52 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct.
2832 (2004); see, e.g., United States v. Delpit, 94 E3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) ("It is well
established that experts may help the jury with the meaning of jargon and codewords.");
United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 E2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1989) (identifying law
enforcement expert testimony interpreting drug jargon as "the paradigm situation for expert
testimony under Rule 702"), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Price, 76 E3d
526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996).
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who seek exclusion based on a more critical judicial analysis-arguing
that jurors can understand drug-related words without assistance, that
jurors should be permitted to draw their own inferences, or that any
arguable relevance is "substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice" to the defendant-invariably fail.1 4
Why should we be concerned that police experts often play a
crucial role in obtaining convictions? At a minimum, this fact
demonstrates that the Daubert revolution, aimed at upgrading the
quality of expert evidence, has had surprisingly little impact in the
criminal courts. Eleven years after Daubert and four years after
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 was amended to include a more explicit
reliability requirement, the most common type of prosecution expert
testimony continues to escape judicial scrutiny." A review of the
relevant case law demonstrates that Daubert and Rule 702 have failed
in their promise to create consistent and equitable admission standards
in the criminal courts.16
14. FED. R. EviD. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence?'); see, e.g., Dukaguini, 326 E3d at 52 ("Turning to
appellants' first argument, we reject the contention that, because the conversations were
readily understandable, the expert testimony should have been excluded altogether. The
Rules of Evidence provide a liberal standard for the admissibility of expert testimony.
Frequently, some of the details of drug operations, as they emerge in intercepted
conversations, are quite opaque." (citations omitted)); United States v. Castiello, 915 E2d 1, 3
(1st Cir. 1990) ("[T]he vocabular [sic] form the defendant employed with Desmond was not
so readily comprehensible to the layman that it could not bear elucidation by a law
enforcement agent knowledgeable in the ways of the drug world. The admission was phrased
in drug world jargon."); United States v. Rollins, 862 E2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988)
(rejecting defendant's argument that jurors could understand the meaning of the telephone
conversations without assistance from the FBI expert). But see United States v. Gonzalez-
Maldonado, 115 F.3d 9, 17 (1st Cir. 1997) (noting that '"[expert testimony on a subject that
is well within the bound of a jury's ordinary experience generally has little probative value').
15. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 now reads:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto
in the form of an opinion or otherwise, if(l) the testimony is based upon sufficient
facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable pnnciples and methods,
and (3) the witness has applied the pnnciples and methods reliably to the facts of
the case.
FED. R. EvtD. 702 (italics indicate December 1, 2000, amendments to the previous rule).
16. See Lloyd Dixon & Brian Gill, Changes in the Standards forAdmitbng Expert
Evidence in Federal Civil Cases Since the Daubert Decision, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & LAW
251, 252 (2002) ("Before Dauberi there was no universally followed standard for
determining the admissibility of expert evidence in the federal courts.").
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Judges abjure their gatekeeping responsibilities when they fail to
scrutinize an expert's qualifications, methodology, and application of
these methods to the facts.'7  But more careful pretrial screening is
only a partial solution. Once the police expert takes the stand, the
court must control the scope of her testimony. Currently, judicial
control of prosecution experts is so lax that "hardly a day goes by
when some beat cop or narcotics detective somewhere isn't testifying
as an expert about one thing or another, from the intent of a defendant
caught with drugs to the organizational structure and hierarchy of
street gangs."'8 This can include highly speculative testimony, such as
telling the jury that the "fact" that a defendant had rolled up his pants
leg meant that he was selling drugs.' 9 It can also include expert
inferences and conclusions about a defendant's purpose or intent, such
as telling the jury that a defendant's statement "I was on that last night,
plus we're going to be on that tonight," means that he was planning to
"locate or find some individual and hurt them."2° This type of
testimony, grounded only in an expert's subjective on-the-job
experience, continues unabated as courts consistently reject defense
challenges based on Federal Rules of Evidence 702," 704(b),22 or
403.23
17. See FED. R. Evn. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 153 (1999)
(emphasizing that admissibility is often determined by the application of an expert's
methodology to the facts at issue); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-
95 (1993) (providing four objective, but flexible, admissibility criteria for future courts:
(1) testability, (2) peer review and publication, (3) error rate, and (4) general acceptance).
18. Hansen, supra note 7, at 32.
19. United States v. Harris, 192 E3d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1999).
20. United States v. Gibbs, 190 E3d 188, 210 (3d Cir. 1999) (internal quotations
omitted); id. at 211 (holding that while this statement was unhelpful, it was harmless error
and did not violate Rule 704(b) because the expert's testimony never crossed into interpreting
the defendant's intent or mental state).
21. FED. R. EvID. 702.
22. Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) reads:
No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an element
of the crime charged or of a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters for
the trier of fact alone.
FED. R. EviD. 704(b); see United States v. Dukagjini, 326 E3d 45, 53 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Rule
704(b) ... does not restrict conclusions about facts, such as opinion evidence identifying
subjects of a conversation. In Simmons [923 E2d 934, 942 (2d Cir. 1991)], we concluded
that the witness's interpretation of drug terminology, including specification of certain drugs,
did not violate 704(b) because it left to the jury the task of determining whether the decoded
terms demonstrated the necessary criminal intent." (internal quotations omitted)), cert.
denied 124 S. Ct. 2832 (2004); United States v. Theodoropoulos, 866 F2d 587, 591 (3d Cir.
1989) (finding that FBI expert's opinions about the structure of the drug trafficking operation
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Problems of prejudice and confusion also arise when, as is often
the case, the law enforcement expert is the investigating officer.24 The
circuits are in significant disagreement about whether police expert
testimony should be limited to the officer's general knowledge or
whether it may properly include specific inferences drawn from facts
developed during the investigation of the defendant's case.25 Problems
abound when experts make inferences and draw conclusions that rely
on factual evidence derived from their own investigations. The dual
role of fact and expert witness contains a built-in incentive for the
witness to shape the facts to fit the opinion or the opinion to fit the
facts. Witnesses can also deliberately or unintentionally blur the
distinction between fact and opinion misleading or confusing jurors in
violation of Rule 403.26 Whenever an expert draws from personal
knowledge gained during an investigation from sources that have
unestablished reliability, it also increases the likelihood that her
testimony will contain otherwise inadmissible evidence. Finally,
and the role played by each defendant did not violate Rule 704), overruled on other grounds
by United States v. Price, 76 F3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996). For an interesting discussion of
how police expert testimony describes whether an amount of drugs was intended for personal
use or distribution, see Dana R. Hassin, How Much Is Too Much?" Rule 704(b) Opinions on
Personal Use vs. Intent to Distrbute, 55 U. MIAMI L. REv. 667 (2001).
23. See FED. R. EviD. 403.
24. For a rare and thoughtful discussion of this dual role, see United States v. Young,
745 F.2d 733 (2d Cir. 1984). This case was a narcotics prosecution where both a police
officer and a detective involved in the investigation provided expert testimony at trial. Judge
Newman wrote a concurring opinion that described the "special risk" that arises because of
'the aura of special reliability and trustworthiness' surrounding expert testimony," id. at 766
(Newman, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Fosher, 590 E2d 381, 383 (1st Cir. 1979)).
He added that "[t]he risk is increased when the opinion is given by 'the very officers who
were in charge of the investigation."' Id. (Newman, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Sette, 334 F.2d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1964)).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, No. 99-50018, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS
18004, at * 10 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001) (noting that because DEA agent's knowledge of drug
jargon "was likely not the result of observations made while working on this case, he should
have been qualified as an expert witness"), cert. denie4 534 U.S. 1147 (2002); see also
discussion hfifia Part IB.A.
26. See FED. R. EvID. 403; Young, 745 F2d at 765-66. The Young court noted that
"[e]ven if [police officer expert testimony is] admissible under Rule 702, opinion testimony is
still subject to exclusion under Rule 403 'if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger of unfair prejudice.' Whatever slight probative value arises from a narcotics
expert's personal opinion that an observed transaction involved a sale of drugs must be
carefully weighed against the distinct risk of prejudice." Young, 745 E2d at 765-66.
27. Rule 703 makes clear that expert testimony, with probative value, may be based
on inadmissible evidence. "If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted." FED. R. EviD.
703. However, inadmissible testimony cannot be repeated to the jury under the guise of
expertise. See, e.g., United States v. Rollins, 862 F.2d 1282, 1293 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding
TULANE LA WREVIEW
judicial qualification of a police officer as an "expert" can imbue all of
her testimony, including her fact testimony, with an aura of neutrality
or expertise that can artificially enhance her credibility.
We have a problem when twenty-first-century criminal courts
seem like the Wild West to the expert who carries a gun and a badge.
Recent empirical data and a review of relevant cases reveal that law
enforcement experts who serve as members of the prosecution team
have essentially unfettered access to juries. It is inarguable that jurors
may require expert assistance analyzing foreign or unfamiliar evidence
in some cases. When police officers have necessary expertise and can
demonstrate the reliability of their methods and the proper application
of these methods to the appropriate facts, they should be permitted to
testify. However, there is no excuse for failing to subject expert
opinions to the more rigorous scrutiny required by any reasonable
reading of Daubet28 General Electric Co. v.Joiner,29 Kumho Tire Co.
v Carmichael,° and the new Rule 702.' The complex problems
endemic to law enforcement expert testimony have been ignored for
too long by judges easily satisfied with a cursory review of expert
qualifications and perfunctory acceptance of a panoply of a police
opinions and conclusions.32
There is no quick fix that will stem the tide of judicial
permissiveness, but there are six sources of hope. First, the beefed-up
reliability requirement added to Rule 702 provides new arguments for
rigorous judicial scrutiny of all expert evidence. Second, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently became the first
federal appellate court to use Rule 702 to assess the reliability of drug
jargon expert testimony.3 Third, Kumho Tire requires that an expert
"employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor" as in
her chosen field." This is impossible because drug jargon is not a
legitimate field of study. Fourth, even when judges opt to admit expert
that drug jargon expert evidence should be excluded if the court determines that the
prosecutor seeks to use the expert as a "mouthpiece" for a cooperating witness who would
not be as credible).
28. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
29. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
30. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
31. FED. R. EV. 702.
32. See Hansen, supra note 7, at 34 ("[T]rial courts hardly ever hold police officers to
the same admissibility standards that apply to other types of expert testimony, some law
scholars charge.").
33. See infia Part II.B.I (discussing United States v Hermanek, 289 E3d 1076 (9th
Cir. 2002), cert. denaie 537 U.S. 1223 (2003)).
34. Kumho Tire Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
[Vol. 79:1
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testimony, a series of recent circuit court cases suggest that judges
must still limit experts' testimony at trial.35 Fifth, the previously
unexplored relationship between drug jargon testimony and propensity
evidence may be an untapped source of effective defense arguments.
Finally, this exploration of how prosecutors use police experts raises
serious questions about how to best ensure that evidentiary standards
do not prejudice criminal defendants.
It is worth mentioning from the start that police officers will
sometimes accurately opine that "pianos," "boyfriends," "briefs," and
"motions" are code words for heroin. 6 But dispensing with judicial
scrutiny because expert testimony is potentially reliable is akin to
dispensing with suppression hearings because they involve potentially
reliable and inevitably inculpatory evidence. The post-September 11
future enhances the dangers of judicial deference to police experts as
law enforcement and prosecutors become endowed with even greater
actual and perceived authority. It is time for criminal courts to
recognize that conscientious judicial oversight is critical in all
prosecutions that rely on police officer expertise.
I. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT: THE FAILURE OF GOOD
INTENTIONS
A. The Promise ofa Daubert Revolution
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.37 was provoked by the growing
concern that jurors were basing legal decisions on unreliable expert
testimony. The underlying rationale of Daubert was that "lay jurors
should not be exposed to unfiltered scientific or technical testimony
that may adversely influence their findings of fact."38 This concern
lead the Court to craft a new judicial gatekeeping role. After Daubet
judges would be required to engage in a more scrupulous assessment
of proffered scientific expert testimony. The need for enhanced
preadmission gatekeeping was based "on two underlying assumptions:
(1) that the trial judge is more knowledgeable in assessing complex
scientific testimony than is the ... lay juror and (2) that each judge
brings to the specific task of gatekeeping a general attitude or
35. See discussion infra Part IV
36. United States v. Griffith, 118 E3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted).
37. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
38. Joseph T. Walsh, Keeping the Gate. The Evolving Role of the Judiciary in
Admitting Scientif7c Evidence, 83 JUDICATURE 140, 143 (1999).
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philosophy concerning the level of scrutiny appropriate for scientific
gatekeepers."3 9  To assist judges who would now need to locate
proffered evidence on the continuum between reliable and unreliable,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, outlined four objective, but
flexible, admissibility criteria: (1) testability, (2) peer review and
publication, (3) error rate, and (4) general acceptance."
In the six years after Daube; the Supreme Court decided two
more "science and law" cases. In GeneralElectric Co. v Joiner, Chief
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, effectively insulated
gatekeeping from appellate review by applying an abuse of discretion
standard to all evidentiary rulings, including the exclusion of scientific
expert testimony.4' The Joiner Court also expanded and refined the
Court's evolving expert admissibility doctrine, suggesting that judges
must avoid simplistic line-drawing. According to the Joiner Court,
39. Id
40. See Dauber4 509 U.S. at 592-95.
41. 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997). The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Joinerto
resolve the question left open by Daubert of the appropriate standard for appellate review of a
trial court's decision to admit or exclude scientific evidence. Id. at 138-39. In Joiner, the
plaintiff claimed the exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) had caused his lung
cancer. Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 E Supp. 1310, 1314 (N.D. Ga. 1994), rev, 78 F3d 524
(11th Cir. 1996), rev'a 522 U.S. 136 (1997). To support his claim, the plaintiff offered four
epidemiological studies that purportedly established a causal link between defendant's PCBs
and plaintiff's cancer. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 145. The district court reviewed the plaintiff's four
studies and found that: (1) the first study did not conclude that PCB had caused lung cancer
among the workers they examined; (2) the second study found that there was a slightly
increased incidence of lung cancer among workers at a PCB plant, but that the increase was
not statistically significant; (3) the third study did not mention PCBs; and (4) the fourth
study's subjects "had been exposed to numerous potential carcinogens." Id at 145-46. After
excluding all of the plaintiff's scientific expert testimony, the district court granted summary
judgment for the defendant. Id. at 140. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit used a "stringent standard of review" to reverse the district court. Id. at 141-43. The
Supreme Court concluded that the appropriate standard was "abuse of discretion." Id at 143.
For examples of cases where errors were deemed harmless, see United States v Dukagil
326 E3d 45, 54 (2d Cir. 2003) (finding harmless error despite the court's finding that
government police experts should be barred from making "sweeping conclusions" that cannot
be grounded in the application of a reliable methodology and that permitting a case agent to
summarize her beliefs creates unfair prejudice to the defendant by, in effect, allowing the
prosecutor to make two summations), cert. denieg 124 S. Ct. 2832 (2004); United States v
Gibbs, 190 E3d 188, 213 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the admission of law enforcement
expert testimony interpreting the defendant's statements was harmless error despite the
court's conclusion that it "was not helpful to the jury" and that "the only purpose of that
testimony was to bolster the government's allegations"); United States v Nersesian, 824 E2d
1294, 1308 (2d Cir. 1987) (finding harmless error despite the court's explicit concern that if
police officer expert interpretation of drug jargon is "uncontrolled" this "use of expert
testimony may have the effect of providing the government with an additional summation by
having the expert interpret the evidence").
42. See Joiner, 522 U.S. at 146.
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judges should recognize that scientific "conclusions and methodology
are not entirely distinct from one another."43 Justice Rehnquist also
specifically reminded judges that they must take their gatekeeping
roles seriously, noting that "nothing in either Daubert or the Federal
Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse d/xit of the expert."
Two years later, the Court offered a significant clarification of the
gatekeeping role in Kumho Tire Co. v Carmichael.45  Kumho Tire
made two explicit additions to the Daubert requirements: (1) Kumho
Tire expanded the scope of the Daubert gatekeeping role to include
testimony by experts with technical or other specialized, nonempirical
knowledge, 6 and (2) Kumho Tire added the requirement that experts
employ "the same level of intellectual rigor" in the courtroom as in
their fields of research. 7
It should be clear, even from this brief discussion, that Daubert
explicitly requires that trial judges independently assess the reliability
of expert evidence as a threshold question of admissibility and not pass
the buck to the jury by labeling this a question of weight. With a
limited number of exceptions, that is how Daubert and its progeny
have been understood.48  The problem, as the empirical evidence
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
46. See id at 147-48; see also Edward K. Imwinkelried, The Taxonomy of Testimony
Iust-Kumho: Refocusing on the Bottomines of Rehability and Necessiy, 30 CUMB. L. REv
185, 209 (2000) (noting that prior to Kumho Ti, "[t]he objective validity of a non-scientific
expert's premises was essentially exempt from any scrutiny").
47. Kumho Tim Co., 526 U.S. at 152.
48. One recent case from the Eleventh Circuit illustrates how courts can misconstrue
their Daubert gatekeeping obligations, effectively abnegating responsibility for reliability
decisions. In Quiet Technology DC-8, Inc. v Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., the appellant
challenged the admission of defense expert trial testimony, arguing that the expert had
"misused a method that, in the abstract, is reliable." 326 E3d 1333, 1345 (1 1th Cir. 2003).
The appellate court recast the question, finding that "although [r]ulings on admissibility
under Daubert inherently require the trial court to conduct an exacting analysis of the
proffered expert's methodology, it is not the role of the district court to make ultimate
conclusions as to the persuasiveness of the proffered evidence." Id at 1341 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). By redefining the reliability of an expert's application of
his methods to the facts, which should fall squarely within the judge's purview, as a question
of "persuasiveness," the court was able to conclude that "the alleged flaws in Frank's analysis
are of a character that impugn the accuracy of his results, not the general scientific validity of
his methods." Id. at 1345. When the Eleventh Circuit concluded that this finding meant that
the appellant had failed to raise an argument relating to admissibility, the court completely
misconstrued its Daubert obligations. The Eleventh Circuit's mistake was to define this as a
question of weight, leading the court to conclude that "the identification of such flaws in
generally reliable scientific evidence is precisely the role of cross-examination." Id
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demonstrates, is not with the interpretation of the doctrine, but with the
application of the standard in real criminal cases.
B. The Promise ofa New Rule 702
Just four years ago, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
was significantly expanded. 49  The new rule codifies the judicial
"gatekeeping" role created in Daubeii and refined in Joiner and
Kumho Tire. Rule 702 now governs the admission of expert
testimony as follows:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise,
if (1)the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product ofrehable pnnciples and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the prnciples and methods reliably to the facts of
the Case.
53
The revised rule was a direct response to developing Supreme Court
doctrine on science and law and an attempt to circumvent judicial
efforts to avoid gatekeeping "through the simple expedient of
proffering an expert in lay witness clothing.,1
4
The amendments to Rule 702 reflect the fact that pretrial
admissibility decisions now require an independent judicial reliability
assessment. In fact, the Advisory Committee's Note specifically
explains that, like Dauber "[t]he amendment affirms the trial court's
role as gatekeeper and provides some general standards that the trial
court must use to assess the reliability and helpfulness of proffered
expert testimony.""5 The Supreme Court's decision in Joiner is the
49. FED. R. EviD. 702.
50. 509 U.S. 579, 592-95 (1993).
51. 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997).
52. 526 U.S. at 147-48, 152.
53. FED. R. EVID. 702 (italics indicate December 1, 2000, amendments to the previous
rule).
54. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note (noting that some courts have
become too lenient in the admission of lay witness testimony on subjects that are appropriate
for expert testimony).
55. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee's note. However, the Advisory Committee
also warns that the new rule should not be interpreted as requiring satisfaction of all of the
Daubert guidelines as a prerequisite to the admission of expert evidence. According to the
Advisory Committee, "[n]o attempt has been made to 'codify' these specific [Dauber]
factors. Daubert itself emphasized that the factors were neither exclusive nor dispositive.
Other cases have recognized that not all of the specific Daubert factors can apply to every
type of expert testimony." Id To highlight the fact that the Daubert guidelines are neither
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source of the new Rule 702 requirement that judges scrutinize the
expert's application of principles and methods to the specific facts of
the case, rather than simply the expert's conclusions." The new rule
also incorporates the Kumho Tire holding that gatekeeping
requirements must now be applied to the broad range of experts who
have "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge." 7
The Advisory Committee also clarified the relationship between
Federal Rules of Evidence 702 and 703.
There has been some confusion over the relationship between Rules
702 and 703. The amendment makes clear that the sufficiency of the
basis of an expert's testimony is to be decided under Rule 702. Rule
702 sets forth the overarching requirement of reliability, and an analysis
of the sufficiency of the expert's basis cannot be divorced from the
ultimate reliability of the expert's opinion. In contrast, the "reasonable
reliance" requirement of Rule 703 is a relatively narrow inquiry. When
an expert relies on inadmissible information, Rule 703 requires the trial
exclusive nor dispositive, the Advisory Committee listed several other factors that judges
should consider relevant to determining the validity and admissibility of proffered expert
testimony. These include "[w]hether the expert has unjustifiably extrapolated from an
accepted premise to an unfounded conclusion," "[w]hether the expert has adequately
accounted for obvious alternative explanations;' and "[w]hether the field of expertise claimed
by the expert is known to reach reliable results for the type of opinion the expert would give?'
Id. (citing Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999); Moore v. Ashland Chem.,
Inc., 151 E3d 269 (5th Cir. 1998); Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F2d 1188 (6th Cir.
1988)).
56. 522 U.S. at 146 (noting that there must be sufficient correlation between the
specific data and the expert's conclusions for the evidence to be admissible). As courts begin
to apply the amended rule, some have explicitly recognized the broader scope and more
detailed fact-intensive inquiry. For example, in Rudd v General Motors Corp., the court
noted that "[w]hile Kumho affirmed the potential applicability of the Daubert factors to
testimony that is technical-, engineering-, or experienced-based, the Kumbo court also made
it clear that a trial court should tailor its Rule 702 evaluation to the particular circumstances
before it." 127 E Supp. 2d 1330, 1336 (M.D. Ala. 2001). This same court also recognized
that
the new Rule 702 appears to require a trial judge to make an evaluation that delves
more into the facts than was recommended in Daube4 including as the rule does
an inquiry into the sufficiency of the testimony's basis ("the testimony is based
upon sufficient facts or data") and an inquiry into the application of a methodology
to the facts ("the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case").
Id.
57. See FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note ("Consistently with Kumho, the
rule as amended provides that all types of expert testimony present questions of admissibility
for the trial court in deciding whether the evidence is reliable or helpful."); Kumho Tire Co.,
526 U.S. at 147-48.
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court to determine whether that information is of a type reasonably
relied on by other experts in the field. 8
It is now clear that 702 regulates the flow of information to the jury
and Rule 703, which has a more limited role,
governs only the disclosure to the jury of information that is reasonably
relied on by an expert, when that information is not admissible for
substantive purposes. It is not intended to affect the admissibility of an
expert's testimony. Nor does the amendment prevent an expert from
relying on information that is inadmissible for substantive purposes.59
In practice, this clarification should preclude proponents of expert
testimony from arguing that Rule 703 operates independently to admit
evidence, if it is of a type "reasonably relied upon by experts in the
particular field, '60 despite the fact that it does not satisfy Rule 702.
C RecentEmpi'calEvidence Shows thatDaubert and the New
Rule 702 Have Failed to Transfonn the Criminal Courts
Daubert requires an extraordinary exercise of judgment on matters of
considerable intellectual complexity if the evidentiary landscape of the
courtroom is to match that of the laboratory-rather, say, than that of
the National Enquirer
6
'
Given the importance of Daubert and its explicit directive to
future judges that they change their behavior, it would be reasonable to
assume that Daubert would have had a dramatic effect on the criminal
courts over the past decade.6' Recently psychologists and lawyers have
joined forces to map Daubert's effect on federal and state appellate
courts.6' This comprehensive new study was motivated both by
curiosity about the real-world implications of Daubert and a nagging
concern that courts and commentators have been too focused on
Dauberfs civil implications. 6' To these researchers, and others, this
disparity seemed counterintuitive given the fact that Dauber's
58. FED. R. Evil. 702 advisory committee's note.
59. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee's note.
60. FED. R. EvID. 703.
61. Brian Leiter, The Epistemology ofA dmissibility Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy ofEvidence, 1997 BYU L. REv 803, 816-17.
62. See Groscup et al., supm note 6, at 353 ("Given the importance of the Daubert
decision and the attention paid to it, a dramatic increase in the courts' attention to the four
Daubet criteria would be expected.").
63. See id. at 342-43.
64. Seeid at 341-42.
[Vol. 79:1
2004] DIR TYHARR YAS ANEXPER T WITNESS 15
influence on criminal cases "is especially important because of the
significance of a potentially unfavorable outcome for the defendant."65
Before beginning this project, the authors predicted that they
would find that judges were actively applying Rule 702 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence (or the state equivalent) and using Daubert's four
admissibility criteria to screen expert evidence proffered by both
prosecutors and defendants.66 To test this hypothesis, researchers
65. Id. at 342 ("In a criminal case, the outcome of the decision to admit or exclude
expert testimony could affect the defendant's freedom, liberty, and life."); see also Paul C.
Giannelli, The Supreme Court s "Criminal" Daubert Cases, 33 SEToN HALL L. REv 1071,
1072-76 (2003). Giannelli argues that this outcome is not only counterintuitive, but unfair:
"The notion that expert testimony in criminal and civil cases should be treated differently
does not seem, at least to me, to be a remarkable proposition. The issues are very different.
Instead of worrying about the "hired gun" phenomenon as in civil litigation, the criminal
defense lawyer often lacks money for any 'gun."' Id. at 1072.
66. Groscup et al., supra note 6, at 353. Nearly thirty states have adopted Daubei in
whole or in part. See Alabama: S. Energy Homes, Inc. v. Washington, 774 So. 2d 505, 517
n.5 (Ala. 2000) (acknowledging that the legislature has used Daubert with respect to DNA
evidence, but not explicitly switching the standard from Frye to Daubert for other evidence);
Alaska: State v. Coon, 974 P2d 386, 389-99 (Alaska 1999) (adopting the Daubert standard);
Arizona: Logerquist v. McVey, 1 R3d 113, 129 (Ariz. 2000) (en banc) (retaining the Frye
standard); Arkansas: Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. v. Foote, 14 S.W3d 512, 519 (Ark. 2000)
(adopting the Daubert standard); California: People v. Leahy, 882 P2d 321, 323-31 (Cal.
1994) (refusing to adopt Daubert and noting that California has long held to the Frye standard
and would continue to do so); Colorado: People v. Schreck, 22 R3d 68, 78 (Colo. 2001)
(allowing the use of Daubert factors to make a determination under the state law test);
Connecticut: State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 751 (Conn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert
standard); Delaware: Bell Sports, Inc. v. Yarusso, 759 A.2d 582, 589 (Del. 2000) (adopting
Daubert expressly); Florida: Brim v. State, 695 So. 2d 268, 271-72 (Fla. 1997) (rejecting
Dauber; Georgia: Jordan v. Georgia Power Co., 466 S.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ga. 1995)
(applying state law and not adopting Dauber); Hawaii: State v. Fukusaku, 946 R2d 32, 42-43
(Haw. 1997) (declining to apply Daubertto issues of "technical knowledge"); Idaho: State v.
Trevino, 980 P2d 552, 557-58 (Idaho 1999) (applying the Daubertstandard); Illinois: People
v. Basler, 740 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ill. 2000) (noting that the Frye standard is followed in Illinois);
Indiana: Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Manuilov, 742 N.E.2d 453, 461 n.5, 462 (Ind. 2001)
(stating that "federal jurisprudence interpreting Daubert is not binding" on Indiana state
courts); Iowa: Leaf v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 590 N.W2d 525, 530-33 (Iowa 1999)
(adopting a limited application of Daubez); Kansas: State v. Canaan, 964 P2d 681, 691-92,
694 (Kan. 1998) (retaining the Frye standard), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 962 (2003); Kentucky:
Fugate v. Commonwealth, 993 S.W.2d 931, 937 (Ky. 1999) (declining to require a Daubert
hearing on certain methods of DNA analysis); Louisiana: State v. Ledet, 792 So. 2d 160,
172-73 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2001) (adopting the Daubert standard); Maine: State v.
MacDonald, 718 A.2d 195, 198 (Me. 1998) (adopting Dauberl; Maryland: Hutton v. State,
663 A.2d 1289, 1295-96 n.10 (Md. 1995) (determining that Maryland will still follow the
Frye standard despite the fact that Maryland's Rules of Evidence are patterned after the
Federal Rules of Evidence and were passed into legislation after the Daubert decision);
Massachusetts: Commonwealth v. Senior, 744 N.E.2d 614, 618-19 (Mass. 2001) (applying
various Daubert factors); Michigan: Nelson v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 566 N.W2d 671, 673-74
(Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (citing Daubert several times, although the Michigan Supreme Court
has not yet addressed the issue); Minnesota: State v. Klawitter, 518 N.W.2d 577, 585 & n.3
(Minn. 1994) (noting that the Frye standard has been utilized before and after Daubert
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examined 693 appellate court decisions. These were evenly divided
between federal and state cases.68  Data were gathered using two
methods. The first method was an attempt to measure Daubefs
impact by calculating the length of each portion of the text of the
opinion devoted to each of the admissibility criteria.69  The second
although expressing that "we do not address the effect of the Daubert decision on the use or
application of the Frye rule in Minnesota"); Mississippi: Janssen Pharm. v. Bailey, 878 So.
2d 31, 59 (Miss. 2004) (acknowledging the amendment of the state rule in response to
Dauber); Missouri: Callahan v. Cardinal Glennon Hosp., 863 S.W2d 852, 860 (Mo. 1993)
(en banc) (applying Frye); Montana: State v. Moore, 885 P2d 457, 470-71 (Mont. 1994)
(adopting the Daubert standard); Nebraska: Schafersman v. Agland Coop, 631 N.W2d 862,
876 (Neb. 2001) (adopting the Daubertstandard); Nevada: Dow Chem. Co. v. Mahlum, 970
P.2d 98, 108 n.3 (Nev. 1999) (declining to adopt Daubertexpressly); New Hampshire: State
v. Cort, 766 A.2d 260, 265 (N.H. 2000) (declining to decide whether Frye should be
superseded as the test applied in New Hampshire courts); New Jersey: State v. Harvey, 699
A.2d 596, 621 (N.J. 1997) (applying various Daubert factors); New Mexico: State v.
Anderson, 881 P2d 29, 36-37 (N.M. 1994) (adopting the Daubert standard); New York:
People v. Wemick, 674 N.E.2d 322, 324 (N.Y. 1996) (retaining the Frye standard); North
Carolina: Howerton v. Arai Helmet, 597 S.E.2d 674, 690 (N.C. 2004) (rejecting Daubert in
favor of a more flexible test); North Dakota: City of Fargo v. McLaughlin, 512 N.W.2d 700,
705 & n.2 (N.D. 1994) (retaining the Frye standard); Ohio: State v. Martens, 629 N.E.2d 462,
466 n.3 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (declining to adopt the Daubert standard expressly); Oregon:
State v. O'Key, 899 P.2d 663, 680 (Or. 1995) (adopting the Daubert standard); Oklahoma:
Taylor v. State, 889 P2d 319, 328-30 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (adopting, in this criminal
case, the Daubert standard as it applies to novel "scientific or technical evidence");
Pennsylvania: Commonwealth v. Arroyo, 723 A.2d 162, 170 & n. 10 (Pa. 1999) (retaining the
Frye standard); Rhode Island: State v. Quattrocchi, 681 A.2d 879, 884 n.2 (R.I. 1996)
(declining to expressly adopt the Daubert standard); South Carolina: State v. Council, 515
S.E.2d 508, 518 (S.C. 1999) (using factors similar to, but not specifically adopting, the
Daubert factors); South Dakota: State v. Hofer, 512 N.W2d 482, 484 (S.D. 1994) (adopting
the Daubert standard); Tennessee: McDaniel v. CSX Transp., Inc., 955 S.W2d 257, 265
(Tenn. 1997) (adopting the Daubert standard); Texas: E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v.
Robinson, 923 S.W2d 549, 554-56 (Tex. 1995) (adopting the Daubert standard); Utah: State
v. Butterfield, 27 P.3d 1133, 1141 (Utah 2001) (stating that the test for admissibility requires
threshold showing of "inherent reliability"); Vermont: State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229
(Vt. 1993) (adopting the Daubert decision); Virginia: Spencer v. Commonwealth, 393 S.E.2d
609, 621 (Va. 1990) (declining to follow Frye, but not adopting Dauber6; Washington: State
v. Copeland, 922 P.2d 1304, 1310 (Wash. 1996) (retaining the Frye standard); West Virginia:
Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203 (W. Va. 1993) (adopting the Daubert decision);
Wisconsin: State v. Peters, 534 N.W2d 867, 871-72 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995) (basing
admissibility on three-part relevance test); Wyoming: Bunting v. Jamieson, 984 P2d 467,470
(Wyo. 1999) (adopting the Daubert standard). The District of Columbia has not yet adopted
Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and there has been no majority opinion that has addressed
Daubert. Cf Taylor v. United States, 661 A.2d 636, 651-52 (D.C. 1995) (Newman, J.,
dissenting) (urging the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Dauber).
67. Groscup et al., supra note 6, at 344.
68. Id Researchers reviewed and coded 372 criminal appellate cases from the
federal courts and 321 from state appellate courts. Id
69. See id. at 348 (including as admission criteria Rule 702, Frye, and each of the
four Daubert factors (peer review and publication, error rate, falsifiability, and general
acceptance)). The initial measurement involved counting the number of words addressing
each criteria. Id Researchers found that the average length of a federal/state criminal
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method involved a more detailed assessment of the degree of influence
each of the Daubert factors exerted on the appellate court's decision.
7 °
The data do not support their initial hypothesis.7' In fact, the data
supports the opposite conclusion; that "the most mysterious impact of
the Daubert decision [on the criminal courts] is the lack of discussion
devoted to the four Daubertcriteria themselves. 72
This study provides the first empirical evidence that despite all of
the academic time and attention paid to Daubert it has had little or no
impact in real criminal cases. In addition, the study offers unique
insight into the profile of a typical criminal case appealed, at least in
part, because of the trial judge's decision to admit or exclude expert
evidence. Although it is not surprising to learn that 97.4% of criminal
appeals were filed by criminal defendants, we now know that in 76.1%
of these cases the appeal focused on prosecution expert testimony
admitted by the trial court.73 It is also interesting to note that in 66% of
these cases no experts testified at trial for the defense.7
This study also presents a global picture of the different types of
expert testimony generally offered by both sides in a criminal case.
Although researchers classified more than seventy different "expert
domains," they organized their data into four categories of expert
testimony: (1) technical-engineering, (2) medical-mental health,
(3) scientific, and (4) business.75 Using these categories, they found
that prosecutors were most likely to rely on testimony from "technical
experts., 76 They also discovered that the most common prosecution
technical expert is a law enforcement officer.77 Law enforcement
experts are most commonly called to testify to police procedures,
which "typically concerned officers' observations of drug dealing
activities and the procedures used by the police in apprehending this
appellate opinion is 5257 words. Id at 350. The average length of the judge's discussion of
expert testimony is 968 words. Id. Judges devoted the most attention to the application of
Rule 702 (an average of 228 words). Id. Frye received an average of seventy-nine words,
while Daubert received an average of sixty-one words. Id. The four Daubert reliability
criteria, in descending order of importance were: general acceptance (an average of 22.73
words); falsifiability (an average of 4.69 words); error rate (an average of 2.35 words); and
peer review and publication (an average of.7 words). Id
70. Id. at 343.
71. Id. at 353.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 344.
74. Id. at 344-45.
75. Id. at 345.
76. Id. (following technical experts were medical-mental health experts, scientific
experts, and business experts, the least common type of expert).
77. Id.
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type of perpetrator.""8 In fact, more than 34% of all experts proffered
by prosecutors were experts in "police procedures."79
Finally, the study provides deeply disturbing empirical support
for what the cases tell us anecdotally: that, despite Daubert, judges
remain remarkably willing to admit prosecution experts but reluctant
to admit experts testifying for the defense. Judicial behavior might be
explained by the fact that "[p]rosecution experts are frequently
employees of the state and are crucial to the adjudication of criminals
... [so] they could be perceived as inherently reliable."8 It might also
be explained by the fact that "prosecutors and defense attorneys need
different types of experts to make their cases-in-chief."81 Whatever the
explanation, Daubert appears to have had little impact on the
overwhelming inclination of judges to admit prosecution experts in
police procedures. Before Dauber, judges admitted 90.3% of these
experts, after DauberA 89.9%.12
I. WITNESS FOR THE PROSECUTION: THE EXPERT POLICE OFFICER
A. The Federal Courts Assume that Drug Jargon Expertise Is
Helpful andReliable
"I think the courts tend to roll over when police officers are proffered as
experts.
8 3
How do judges decide whether jurors can understand expert
evidence without assistance? The Advisory Committee's Note to Rule
702 suggests that expert opinions are warranted only when "[a]n
intelligent evaluation of the facts is ... difficult or impossible without
the application of some scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge"8 4  In practice, it appears that whenever the expert is a
police officer, this threshold requirement disappears. Judges are
satisfied with nothing more than the prosecutor's assertion that law
enforcement expertise is required."
78. Id.
79. Id. at 346.
80. Id. at 342.
81. See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 109 (noting that prosecutors generally use experts
to explain physical facts while defense attorneys use experts to describe the defendant's
mental state).
82. Groscup et al., supra note 6, at 347.
83. Hansen, supra note 7, at 34 (quoting Professor David L. Faigman).
84. FED. R. EvrD. 702 advisory committee's note.
85. See Hansen, supra note 7, at 32, 34.
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The problem with allowing police officers to testify as experts is that
courts rarely require that police meet the standards of relevancy and
reliability, standards which are required of experts in other fields. Thus,
while most states would require scientific, technological, or other
specialized experts to present reliable statistical proof supporting their
opinions, "when it comes to police,... '[the testimony] kind of slips in
under the gatekeeper's door."'
Inevitably, in certain cases, police officers will have a more
sophisticated or comprehensive understanding of the language or
behavior of those who sell drugs than the average juror. When
appropriate and in a limited fashion, judges should allow prosecutors
to present this evidence to the jury. Problems arise when claims of
expertise are not evaluated, when experts are allowed to instruct the
jury that factual evidence should lead them to draw specific
inculpatory inferences, and when the boundaries of expert testimony
are vague or nonexistent.
Numerous federal circuit courts have simply assumed, without
explanation or support, "that narcotics code words and the operations
of drug dealers are generally an appropriate subject for expert
testimony."87  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, for example, has "repeatedly upheld the use of expert
testimony by government agents to describe the characteristics and
operating methods of narcotics dealers."88  It has also found that
"experienced narcotics agents may explain the use and meaning of
codes and jargon developed by drug dealers to camouflage their
activities."" Similarly, the Tenth Circuit "has repeatedly held that in
86. Elizabeth Ahem Wells, Warrantless Traffic Stops: A Suspension of
Constitutional Guarantees in Post September l1th America, 34 U. TOL. L. REV. 899, 911
(2003) (quoting Professor James Starrs, George Washington University).
87. United States v. Rollins, 862 E2d 1282, 1292 (7th Cir. 1988); see also United
States v. Garcia, 291 E3d 127, 139 (2d Cir. 2002) ("We long have recognized that drug
dealers seldom negotiate the terms of their transactions with the same clarity as business
persons engaged in legitimate transactions.").
88. United States v. Boissoneault, 926 E2d 230, 232 (2d Cir. 1991) (citations
omitted). The court noted, however, that the defense did not challenge the expert's
qualifications at trial. Id. at 231 n. 1.
89. Id at 232; see alsoUnited States v. Campino, 890 E2d 588, 592-93 (2d Cir. 1989)
(holding that a case agent's testimony about drug operations was properly admitted and did
not violate Rule 704); United States v. Tutino, 883 E2d 1125, 1133-34 (2d Cir. 1989)
(rejecting defendants' contention that admission of a DEA agent's testimony deprived them of
a fair trial and noting that the operations of narcotics dealers are a proper subject for expert
testimony under Rule 702); United States v. Garcia, 848 E2d 1324, 1335 (2d Cir. 1988)
(holding that a DEA agent's testimony interpreting drug jargon was properly admitted), revi
on other grounds sub nom. Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); United States v.
Kusek, 844 E2d 942, 949 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a DEA agent's testimony interpreting
2004]
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narcotics cases, expert testimony can assist the jury in understanding
transactions and terminology. 9° In a very recent decision, the Sixth
Circuit extended this reasoning to approve expert testimony, opining
that loaded guns found within a defendant's reach "play a role in drug
distribution, as dealers carry them for protection and intimidation
purposes."9'
In some cases, judges attempt to ground their conclusions in the
"specialized knowledge" language of Rule 702 and Kumho Tire.92
This approach was adopted by the Third Circuit in a decision
concluding, without scrutiny, that "drug traffickers' jargon is a
specialized body of knowledge and thus an appropriate subject for
expert testimony."93 A similar approach was used by the Fifth Circuit
in a case finding that "[i]t is implausible to think that jurors can
understand such arcane allusions without expert assistance [because
d]rug traffickers' jargon is a specialized body of knowledge, familiar
only to those wise in the ways of the drug trade, and therefore a fit
subject for expert testimony."94 The Ninth Circuit has found that "the
jargon of the narcotics trade and the codes that drug dealers often use
constitute specialized bodies of knowledge-certainly beyond the ken
of the average juror-and are therefore proper subjects of expert
opinion."95  The D.C. Circuit has also applied the "specialized
knowledge" label to drug jargon expertise, noting that "agents'
specialized knowledge would assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence is beyond doubt."96
The remaining circuits simply assume that drug-related language
is so complex or foreign that it simply cannot be understood by the lay
juror. According to the Eighth Circuit, "[t]here is no more reason to
expect unassisted jurors to understand drug dealers' cryptic slang than
antitrust theory or asbestosis." 97 This finding is sometimes premised
coded conversations about drugs was properly admitted and that interpretation of drug jargon
is a proper subject for expert testimony).
90. United States v. Quintana, 70 E 3d 1167, 1171 (10th Cir. 1995).
91. United States v. Swafford, 385 F3d 1026, 1028-29 (6th Cir. 2004).
92. See FED. R. Evi. 702; Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999)
(finding that the language of Rule 702 "makes no relevant distinction between 'scientific'
knowledge and 'technical' or 'other specialized' knowledge").
93. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F3d 188, 211 (3d Cir. 1999).
94. United States v. Griffith, 118 E3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997).
95. United States v. Coleman, No. 99-50018, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18004, at *10
(9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001) (internal quotations omitted), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1147 (2002).
96. United States v. Walls, 70 E3d 1323, 1326 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (internal quotations
and citations omitted).
97. United States v. Delpit, 94 E3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996).
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on the bald assertion that jurors cannot understand drug jargon because
they are unfamiliar with drug culture. For example, the First Circuit
has held that jurors cannot be "expected to be familiar with the idiom
and workings of the heroin community"" and that "[f]ay jurors cannot
be expected to be familiar with the lexicon of the cocaine
community."99 According to the Sixth Circuit, jurors' difficulties are
compounded when they must understand the meaning of words used
"by Hispanic drug traffickers," which require more than mere
translation services from a Spanish-speaking police officers.' ° These
decisions make it abundantly clear that despite superficial differences
in reasoning, the prosecutor's argument that jurors need drug jargon
expertise is accepted without judicial scrutiny in the federal courts.
B. Drug Jargon Expertise Is NotReliable
After DaubelA Kumho Tire, and the new Rule 702, there can be
no doubt that trial judges must prevent the introduction of purported
expert testimony that lacks adequate reliability.0 ' Although a
proponent of expert opinion testimony need not prove that her
opinions are correct, she must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that her testimony is relevant and reliable.'0 2
The drafters of the recent amendment to Rule 702 specifically
contemplated that judges would need to screen the reliability of law
enforcement expert testimony interpreting drug jargon. According to
the Advisory Committee's Note:
The amendment requires that the testimony must be the product of
reliable principles and methods that are reliably applied to the facts of
the case. While the terms "principles" and "methods" may convey a
certain impression when applied to scientific knowledge, they remain
98. United States v. Ladd, 885 E2d 954, 960 (1st Cir. 1989) (noting that because of
jurors' lack of familiarity, "[e]xpert interpretation of drug jargon and practices, supplied by
one versed in the business, has often been admitted to assist the trier of fact in drug-
trafficking cases").
99. United States v. Hoffman, 832 E2d 1299, 1310 (1 st Cir. 1987).
100. United States v. Garcia, No. 95-1224, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 37040, at *14 (6th
Cir. Dec. 4, 1995).
101. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999). I have previously
addressed the relationship between reliability and validity as legal and scientific terms of art.
Although the courts invariably refer to evidentiary reliability, it would be more accurate to
refer to validity, because judges are concerned not only with the reproducibility of results, but
with their broader implications. I have also suggested that validity should properly be viewed
as a continuum, rather than as a binary choice. See Jo~lle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic
Against Junk Science: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice
Breyer at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REv. 1033, 1065-70 (2001).
102. See, e.g., Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc., 186 E3d 412,417-18 (3d Cir. 1999).
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relevant when applied to testimony based on technical or other
specialized knowledge. For example, when a law enforcement agent
testifies regarding the use of code words in a drug transaction, the
principle used by the agent is that participants in such transactions
regularly use code words to conceal the nature of their activities. The
method used by the agent is the application of extensive experience to
analyze the meaning of the conversations. So long as the principles and
methods are reliable and applied reliably to the facts of the case, this
type of testimony should be admitted."3
This section of the Advisory Committee's Note is interesting for three
reasons. The drafters start with two unusual and unsupported factual
findings that provide unwarranted support for prosecutors seeking to
admit drug jargon experts.1 14 First, they assume that "participants in
such [drug] transactions regularly use code words to conceal the nature
of their activities.""1 5 This assumption provides blanket support for the
prosecution's argument that jurors need help understanding the
"regularly use[d] code words" of those accused of drug crimes.
Second, the drafters suggest that all law enforcement experts use the
same presumptively reliable methodology, which involves applying
their "extensive experience to analyze the meaning of the
conversations. 1 6 This implies that all police officers have extensive
experience and that they have a common method of analyzing
ambiguous language used by defendants accused of narcotics crimes.
The third reason that the Advisory Committee's Note is
interesting is that it also provides language that is potentially useful to
the defense. The drafters state unequivocally that Rule 702 requires
that judges scrutinize drug jargon experts' "principles" and "methods"
to determine if they are "reliable" and ascertain whether they have
been "applied reliably to the facts of the case."'0 7 The potential of Rule
103. FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee note. The Advisory Committee's Note
states that
[t]here is no more certain test for determining when experts may be used than the
common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to
determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without
enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject
involved in the dispute.
Id (internal quotations omitted).
104. "[T]he courts continue to allow police officers to testify as experts with hardly a
glance at the scientific methods or techniques underlying their testimony." Hansen, supra
note 7, at 34 (quoting Professor David L. Faigman).
105. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
106. Id
107. Id
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702 to exclude drug jargon expertise is not evident in the recent
empirical data because these questions have only just begun to reach
the federal courts.
1. Testing the Power of New Rule 702
Less than two years ago, in United States v Herrnanek, the Ninth
Circuit became the first federal appellate court to subject drug jargon
expert testimony to a fairly rigorous reliability analysis under Rule
702."o8 This case involved a four month long prosecution of six
defendants for conspiring to distribute cocaine, possession of cocaine
with intent to distribute, and related drug offenses.10'9 The prosecution
relied heavily on more than 200 wiretapped cellular telephone
conversations in which defendants allegedly used coded language to
discuss cocaine transactions. 10
At trial, prosecutors presented expert testimony from FBI Special
Agent John Broderick, which was admitted over defense objections."'
FBI Agent Broderick was the lead investigator in the case, and his
testimony lasted for fourteen days.12 He was permitted to provide his
expert opinion on the modus operandi of cocaine enterprises and to
interpret many of the intercepted telephone conversations.1 3 It should
come as no surprise that all of the coded words and phrases interpreted
by Agent Broderick were defined as references either to cocaine or to
associated drug trafficking activities."4
The defendants did not challenge Agent Broderick's definitions
of words generally accepted in the narcotics trade, such as "boy" for
heroin, or common methods of changing words, such as "pig Latin"
(adding "izn" to the middle of a word).15 Instead, the defense argued
that Rule 702 was violated when the trial court permitted Agent
Broderick to interpret the meaning of coded language that the FBI
agent encountered for the first time in this case.16 The defendants'
argument was that this testimony was unreliable because Agent
Broderick had conceded during cross examination that he had never
heard these coded words before and that none of the words were
108. 289 E3d 1076 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denieg 537 U.S. 1223 (2003).
109. Id at 1082-83.
110. Id. at 1083, 1090.
111. Id. at 1090-92.
112. Id. at 1090.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1090-92.
115. Id. at 1090.
116. Id
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commonly used drug terminology.' 7 Apparently, this argument failed
to impress the district court.
According to the district court, under Rule 702 an expert "need
not state that the exact word is clearly established in the drug world to
mean a specific drug term."' 8 Apparently the requirement of "reliable
principles and methods... applied.., reliably to the facts"' ' could be
satisfied by the expert's own subjective conclusion "that words such as
this are commonly used in the drug trafficking world.' 20 Thus Agent
Broderick's assertions were enough to satisfy the district court that his
opinions were reliable.'
2
'
The Ninth Circuit saw it differently,'22 finding that the district
court had failed, under Rule 702, Daubelt and Kumho Tire, to
establish "the reliability of Broderick's methods for interpreting new
words as code for cocaine.' 23 As a preliminary matter, the trial court
was faulted for not even asking Agent Broderick to identify or explain
his methodology.2 2 According to the Ninth Circuit, this created a
problem because "[a]s a prerequisite to making the Rule 702
determination that an expert's methods are reliable, the court must
assure that the methods are adequately explained.' ' 12 According to the
court:
Under Rule 702, the proffered expert must establish that reliable
principles and methods underlie the particular conclusions offered-
here, the interpretation of particular words as referring to cocaine. As
117. Id at 1090-92.
118. Id at 1091.
119. FED. R. Evi). 702.
120. Hermanek, 289 F.3d at 1091 (internal quotations omitted).
121. See id
122. Before Kumho The, the Ninth Circuit had maintained that judges were not
required to perform a Daubert reliability inquiry when confronted with prosecutors' drug
jargon experts. United States v Plunk involved a Rule 702 challenge to expert testimony
from New York City Police Detective Jerry Speziale, who had been qualified as an expert "in
the field of narcotics trafficking, including wiretapping investigations, analysis of codes,
words, and reference[s] used by narcotics traffickers." 153 E3d 1011, 1016 (9th Cir. 1998)
(internal quotations omitted). The defendant challenged the admission of Detective
Speziale's interpretations under Rule 702 and Daubert arguing that this testimony lacked a
scientific basis. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Daubert did not apply to nonscientific
evidence. Id at 1017. The court also adopted a very narrow view of the preamendment
version of Rule 702, finding that the rule governed only the decision to qualify a witness as
an expert and had no bearing on the question of whether specific expert testimony was
reliable. Id
123. Hermanek, 289 E3d at 1090. This error was deemed harmless, however, in light
of the incriminating nature of the other evidence offered against the defendants. Id at 1096.
124. Id. at 1094.
125. Id.
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the Supreme Court stated in Kumho, the expert must establish the
reliability of the principles and methods employed "to draw a
conclusion regarding the particular matter to which the expert
testimony was directly relevant' '26
In addition to the lack of an explanation of his general methods, Agent
Broderick also failed to explain how he used any of his knowledge or
experience with drug trafficking or with these defendants to interpret
particular words and phrases used in specific conversations.127 This
lead the Ninth Circuit to conclude that "[flrom our review of the
record, [Agent] Broderick appears at times to have interpreted cryptic
language as referring to cocaine simply because he believed appellants
to be cocaine traffickers. Such circular, subjective reasoning does not
satisfy the Rule 702 reliability requirement.,
128
Perhaps Hermanekpresages enhanced judicial skepticism of drug
jargon expertise. Only time will tell. In the interim, we should operate
with the assumption that the reliability bar may be low, and that
defense attorneys must seek other means of exclusion.
C Even Reliable Expert Testimony ShouldBe Excluded ifItIs Not
Helpful
Not all reliable expert testimony should be admitted. In fact,
expert interpretation of allusions to drugs or drug transactions should
be excluded unless "[a]n intelligent evaluation of the facts is ...
difficult or impossible without the application of ... specialized
knowledge." 29  This means that law enforcement experts cannot
properly testify if the conversations can be comprehended without
assistance. In United States v Gonzalez-Maldonado, the First Circuit
concluded that the trial court erred by allowing the federal agent to
comment on the defendant's statements on a tape that needed no
interpretation.'
126. Id (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 154 (1999)).
127. Id. However, the Ninth Circuit was careful to limit its ruling, noting that "[w]e do
not hold that a government expert, including [Agent] Broderick, can never be qualified to
interpret coded drug conversations using words and phrases experienced for the first time in
the prosecution at issue." Id at 1096.
128. Id. at 1096.
129. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
130. 115 E3d 9, 17-18 (lst Cir. 1997) (noting that the error was harmless in light of
the other evidence presented by the prosecution at trial). This case might indicate an
increased willingness to recognize the validity of this type of objection. In an earlier
decision, United States v Castiello, 915 E2d 1 (1st Cir. 1990), the First Circuit had reached a
very different conclusion. In this case the prosecutor's DEA Agent had been permitted to
interpret the following taped statement by the defendant: "[I u]sed to buy stuff off him seven
2004]
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The problem of deciding when expert assistance is required was
also recently addressed by the Second Circuit. In United States v
Garcia, the court developed detailed guidelines for assessing when
drug jargon testimony should be admitted."' Although this case
involved opinion testimony from a lay witness, the criteria is equally
useful in cases involving experts. According to the court, opinion
testimony regarding a defendant's conversation would not be helpful
and should not be admitted when the conversation: (1) "concern[s] a
legitimate topic";132 (2) is spoken "clearly and in full sentences";33
(3) "use[s] words that make sense contextually"; 3 4 (4) "is not
confusing and disjointed"; 135 (5) and "does not involve unusually short
or cryptic statements[,] ... sharp and abbreviated language, unfinished
sentences, or ambiguous references."' 36 The Second Circuit also
concluded:
In order to allow lay opinion testimony interpreting a facially coherent
conversation such as this, the government would have to establish a
foundation that called into question the apparent coherence of the
conversation so that it no longer seemed clear, coherent, or legitimate.
Without a foundation creating doubt about what seemed to be obvious,
it is unlikely that opinion testimony would be helpful to the jury.
Rather, the testimony then would serve to direct the jury what to
conclude on a matter that it should decide in the first instance.
13 7
Finally, the Garcia court suggested that prosecutors should be required
to prove an explicit preexisting agreement by the defendant to speak in
code. This is because "[w]hen a conversation has a legitimate purpose
understandable to a lay person, testimony about a code without some
evidence of prearrangement or some other foundation is
inappropriate.""' The problem, according to the court, is that "[ulnless
courts require the proponents of such testimony to lay a proper
or eight years ago for 35, 37, 33, 34, so you know the market changes, you know what I'm
saying?" Id. at 2. The DEA agent testified that "by naming prices seven, eight years ago,
that indicates to me obviously that the defendant was in business seven or eight years ago."
Id. at 3. The defendant argued that this "interpretation" was not helpful under Rule 702
because the statement contained no drug jargon and was in plain language that jury could
understand. Id The court rejected this argument. Id.; see cases cited supm note 14.
131. 291 E3d 127, 142-43 (2dCir. 2002).
132. Id at 142.
133. Id
134. Id.
135. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
136. Id (internal quotations omitted).
137. Id.
138. Id at 141.
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foundation concerning personal knowledge, every conversation could
be interpreted as coded."'39
The Garcia case is rich with unexplored potential. It provides
powerful support for the argument that unless prosecutors lay a proper
foundation for expert drug jargon testimony based on reliable evidence
of an agreement to communicate in code and evidence that the
defendant's language is otherwise unintelligible, judges cannot simply
assume that jurors will benefit from police expert opinions.
III. WHAT Is DiRTY HARRY'S FIELD OF EXPERTISE?
A. The Federal Courts Assume that Police Off-cers Are Experts in
Drug Jargon
When the expert is a police officer testifying for the prosecutor,
judges ignore, and even ridicule, the notion of scrutinizing her
experiential expertise. For example, in United States v Delpi4 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit permitted the
police officer expert to testify that, in his opinion, "Monster [the
defendant] was in town to shoot some Vice Lords.' ' 40 Although the
appellate court conceded that "Sergeant Murphy appears on occasion
to have gone beyond merely translating straightforward terms'" the
court found the defense challenge to this expert's qualifications
absurd.'4' According to the court, "[t]he argument that Murphy was
unqualified because he lacks degrees or advanced training in the field
is silly. Sergeant Murphy has learned drug dealers' jargon through
nearly thirty years of on-the-job experience, the best education there is
for this type of thing.'
'42
Two recent cases from the First Circuit further illustrate this
hands-off approach to assessing law enforcement experience-based
expert qualifications. In United States v Hoffman, the court found
that the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agent expert was a "street-
wise savant,' 43 who had been properly permitted to decode "cryptic
allusions-largely in the idiom of the vineyard-which the
government maintained were coded negotiations for the purchase and
sale of cocaine."' 44 In a description of the DEA agent's expertise that
practically drips with sarcasm, the court found that "[e]xpertise is not
139. Id. at 141-42.
140. 94 E3d 1134, 1145 (8th Cir. 1996) (internal quotations omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id
143. 832 E2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir. 1987).
144. Id at 1309.
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necessarily synonymous with a string of academic degrees or multiple
memberships in learned societies ... [and] hard-core drug trafficking
scarcely lends itself to ivied halls.''
145
More recently, United States v Rivera-Rosario was a bizarre case
that, according to the First Circuit, "could originate onyin the District
of Puerto Rico.' 4 6 At trial against five co-defendants on charges of
conspiracy to possess (marijuana, cocaine, and heroin) with intent to
distribute, the government was allowed to present extensive evidence
in Spanish, without an English translation.'47 The alleged Spanish drug
jargon was translated into English by DEA Agent Cases. 48 This
evidence included 180 audio tapes in Spanish that were played for the
jury over the course of four days. 14 9 Despite the district court's clear
violation of the English language requirement embodied in the Jones
Act, '5 the First Circuit opted to ignore the 180 audio tapes and review
only the drug jargon evidence that had been presented in English.'5'
According to the court, this decision was justified because "both
parties are prejudiced by the fact that the appellate court cannot review
the non-English language evidence.' 152 The reviewing court found that
the Spanish tapes had been the "gravamen" of the prosecutor's case
and vacated the convictions of two of the five codefendants.'53 Despite
the fact that the appellate court could not even understand the content
of the untranslated evidence which formed the "gravamen" of the
prosecution, the First Circuit did not hesitate to conclude that the DEA
agent had been properly qualified as an expert witness." The court
also held that the trial court properly allowed Agent Cases to interpret
coded conversations for the jury and to testify to his opinion that the
defendant was actively involved in the sale or purchase of illegal
narcotics.'
145. Id.at 1310.
146. 300 F3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 4-5.
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id.
150. 48 U.S.C. § 864 (2000).
151. Rivera-Rosario, 300 F3d at 10.
152. Id
153. Id at 11, 13-14 (reasoning that, for two of the defendants, the untranslated
evidence "has the potential to affect our conclusion that there is sufficient evidence to support
... [their] conviction[s]").
154. Id. at 17 (noting that the agent had conducted approximately twenty-five
investigations).
155. Id.
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Finally, the federal courts have consistently rejected defense
objections based on the fact that law enforcement witnesses are
permitted to offer opinion testimony even when they have not been
qualified as experts. For example, in United States v Griffith, the
prosecution relied on opinion testimony interpreting drug jargon from
a DEA agent who was never offered or qualified as an expert
witness.156 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the expert would have
been qualified and therefore had been implicitly qualified at trial.157 In
a similar decision from the Seventh Circuit, the court rejected the
defendant's argument that the prosecution's law enforcement witness
had offered opinion testimony despite the fact that the court had not
qualified him as an expert."' The appellate court found that the record
demonstrated that the expert was effectively qualified.5 9 The court
also noted that the defendants were not entitled to object to the fact that
the DEA agent was not explicitly identified as an expert in court
because according to the court, this was actually helpful to the
defendant, as the jury was not able to attach excessive weight to the
agent's testimony.
B. The Problems ofExperience-BasedExpertise
Unlike most scientific or technical expertise, which is often
grounded in education and training, drug jargon expertise is always
experience-based. Rule 702 specifically contemplates the admission
of testimony from experts who develop expertise through
experience.' 6' However, the Advisory Committee Note suggests that
experience-based expertise should be subjected to heightened scrutiny:
[When] the witness is relying solely or primarily on experience, then
the witness must explain how that experience leads to the conclusion
reached, why that experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and
how that experience is reliably applied to the facts. The trial court's
156. 118 F.3d 318, 322-23 (5th Cir. 1997); see also United States v. Coleman, No. 99-
50018, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 18004, at *11 (9th Cir. Aug. 7, 2001) (finding that the trial
court's failure to qualify an FBI agent who testified to the meaning of drug jargon was
harmless error), cert denied 534 U.S. 1147 (2002).
157. See Grif'th, 118 E3d at 322-23.
158. United States v. Ramirez, 796 E2d 212, 216-17 (7th Cir. 1986).
159. Id. at 216.
160. Id
161. See FED. R. Evil. 702 advisory committee's note ("Nothing in this amendment is
intended to suggest that experience alone--or experience in conjunction with other
knowledge, skill, training or education-may not provide a sufficient foundation for expert
testimony. To the contrary, the text of Rule 702 expressly contemplates that an expert may be
qualified on the basis of experience.").
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gatekeeping function requires more than simply taking the expert's
word for it.'62
This heightened scrutiny makes sense because there are problems
endemic to experience-based expertise.' When law enforcement
experts testify to their opinions, this "nonscientific testimony may be
based on experience and observation that cannot be objectively
tested."' 64
In court, "some experts exploit situations where intuition or mere
suspicions can be voiced under the guise of experience.' '165 When an
expert opinion is based on personal experience, opinions and
conclusions derived from this experience are often personal,
idiosyncratic, and subjective. There is no objectively ascertainable or
empirically supportable measure of personal experience. 16 6  "[T]he
practical result is that the [experience-based expert] witness is
immunized against effective cross-examination.' 67  The problem of
experiential expertise is further compounded when the entire field is
suspect.
162. Id. (quotations omitted).
163. A recent article exploring the use of police officer experts to explain the behavior
of street gang members noted that although "the testimony of experts testifying about
nonscientific matters must be both relevant and reliable ... [n]onscientific expert testimony
presents trial courts with special concerns." Plicido G. G6mez, It Is Not So Simply Because
an Expert Says ItIs So: The Reliabihy of Cang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in
Criminal Street Gangs. Pushing the Limits of Texas Rule of Evidence 702, 34 ST. MARY'S
L.J. 581, 599 (2003) (footnote omitted). "[T]here is less assurance of the accuracy and
truthfulness of nonscientific expert testimony." Id. at 600 (internal quotations omitted).
164. Id. at 599-600.
165. DAVID L. FAiGMAN, DAVID H. KAYE, MICHAEL J. SAKS & JOSEPH SANDERS,
SCIENCE IN THE LAW: FORENSIC SCIENCE ISSUES 16 (2002).
166. Various commentators have tackled the problem of reconciling the Supreme
Court's obvious focus on empirical science in Daubert with the Kumho Tire Court's decision
that the same reliability criteria may apply to nonscientific expertise. If the Kumho Tire
Court had adopted a different view, we might have different standards for assessing
experiential expertise.
The [Kumho Tire] Court could have taken a different route, one more consistent
with Dauberfs holding that scientific evidence is distinguishable. It could have
held that non-scientific experts are not subject to the four-part Daubertfactors. It
could have recognized that what it called "experience based" experts derive and
express their opinions in a manner quite different from scientific reasoning.... In
assessing the credibility of such an expert, the jury [would be] in approximately the
position it occupies when judging the testimony of any witness who has observed a
detail through one of the five senses.
David Crump, The Trouble with Daubert-Kumho.' Reconsideing the Supreme Court
Philosophy ofScience, 68 Mo. L. REv. 1, 14 (2003).
167. FAIGMAN, KAYE, SAKS&SANDERS, supranote 165, at 16.
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C Can Anyone Be an Expert in Drug Jargon?
1. The Kumho Tire "Intellectual Rigor" Requirement
In Kumho Tire, the Supreme Court said that following Daubert
the court must exclude unreliable testimony16  According to Justice
Breyer, writing for the majority, judges must ensure that the expert
"employs in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice of an expert in the relevant field.''69 This
means that expert testimony must be supported by "[m]ore than bald
assertions of opinion without any support... [because] this is no more
than any rational person would require.," '  In subsequent cases, the
Kumho Tire requirement has been defined by analogy. Just as "[i]t
would be unacceptable to cite no sources for statistical evidence in a
scholarly work, ... it is likewise unacceptable in an expert
disclosure."' 7 '
The "intellectual rigor" requirement also means that even
"[s]terling credentials are not enough.... [A]n expert's outstanding
qualifications will not make the expert's opinion admissible unless the
expert has a valid basis for how and why a conclusion was reached."'
72
This is simply a fleshed out reiteration of the Joiner Court's direction
that judges exclude evidence if it is connected to existing data only by
the "ipse dixit of the expert."'173 Thus, after Kumho Tire, "[e]xperts
must be prepared to establish that their conclusions were reached by
methods that are consistent with how their colleagues in the relevant
field or discipline would proceed to establish a proposition if they were
presented with the same facts and issues.' ' 74 But what happens when
there is no relevant field or discipline outside the courtroom?'75
168. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999).
169. Id
170. Erickson v. Baxter Healthcare, Inc., 131 E Supp. 2d 995, 1000 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
2001) ("One bare assurance is worth just as much as another." (quoting G.EW HEGEL, THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRT 48 (A.V Miller trans., 1977 (1807))).
171. Eickson, 131 E Supp. at 1000.
172. Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony: The Supreme Court Rules, ISSUES IN
Sci. &TECH., Summer 2000, at 57, 61.
173. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146(1997).
174. Berger, supranote 172, at 61.
175. Professors Michael J. Saks and D. Michael Risinger have devoted considerable
time and attention to a critique of much forensic evidence, principally handwriting
identification evidence, based on their well-substantiated argument that the discipline itself is
litigation born and driven and lacks all indicia of reliability. See, e.g., D. Michael Risinger,
Michael J. Saks, William C. Thompson & Robert Rosenthal, The Daubert, Kumho
Implications of Observer Effects in Forensic Science." Hidden Pmblems of Expectation and
Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1 (2002); D. Michael Risinger & Michael Saks, Science and
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Professor Edward J. Lmwinkelried has argued persuasively that,
thus far, the "intellectual rigor" requirement has malfunctioned, acting
merely as "a version of the traditional Frye general acceptance
standard-the standard which Daubertovertumed."'
176
The rub is that this factor is nonresponsive to the reliability problem
that the Kumho Tire majority itself highlighted-namely, the self-
validating discipline. A practitioner of such a discipline may very well
"employ[] in the courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that
characterizes the practice" of his or her field outside the courtroom; but
as the Kumho Tire majority observed, "the discipline itself" might
"lack[] reliability."'"
Professor Imwinkelried suggests that a showing that the expert used
"the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an
expert in the relevant field" should be viewed (in conjunction with the
other reliability criteria) as a necessary, but insufficient, condition of
admission.' Using this approach, if an opponent of self-validating
evidence could establish that the field of expertise itself lacks
adequate indicia of reliability (e.g., norms, standards, data collection,
testing mechanisms), an expert's adherence to the rigor of an
inherently unreliable discipline would be an insufficient foundation for
admission.79  This argument can be explored in the context of drug
jargon expertise.
Nonscience in the Courts: Daubert Meets Handwriting Identification Expertirse, 82 IOWA L.
REv. 21 (1996).
176. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Evaluating the Reliability of Nonscientific Expert
Testimony: A Partial Answer to the Questions Lefi Unresolved by Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 52 ME. L. REv. 19, 29 (2000) (footnotes omitted).
177. Id. (footnotes omitted); see also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the Admissibility
ofExperts, 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 191, 207 (2003) ("To defer to the normative standards of
reliability in such disciplines would be to abdicate the basic gatekeeping function."); Mark P.
Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability: How the Question
You Ask Gives You the Answer You Get 34 SETON HALL L. REv. 15, 55-56 (2003) (stating
that a belief warrant for experience-based methodology or skill must pass the "astrology test"
and cannot be premised on proof of mutual self-belief, conformity with group practices and
norms, general acceptance by the group, or peer-review and publication).
178. Imwinkelried, supra note 176, at 29-30 (internal quotations omitted).
179. Kumho Tire itself implicitly recognizes the problem of self-validation within an
inherently unreliable discipline in Justice Breyer's colorful assertion that "the presence of
Daubelds general acceptance factor [does not] help show that an expert's testimony is reliable
where the discipline itself lacks reliability, as, for example, do theories grounded in any so-
called generally accepted principles of astrology or necromancy." Kumho Tire Co. v.
Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 151 (1999).
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2. Drug Jargon Expertise Lacks "Intellectual Rigor"
How do we know that an "amp head" is a person who uses LSD,
a "beamer" is a person who smokes crack, and a "cabbage head" is a
person who uses a wide variety of drugs? The President's Office of
National Drug Policy provides definitions of these terms on its
website.18° Simply logging on to www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov
enables you to access an ever-expanding list of over 2300 "street terms
that refer to specific drug types or drug activity."'181 The website also
promises that source information will be provided upon request.
However, my recent attempts to obtain source information for review
were wholly unsuccessful.
I initially followed the instructions on the website and placed a
telephone call to the administrative offices of the President's Office of
National Drug Policy requesting information that might shed some
light on the reliability of the thousands of purported drug terms listed
on the website. I spoke with Ms. Jennifer Lloyd, who initially told me
that source information could not be provided to outsiders because it
was too voluminous. '82 Moments later, she informed me that source
information was simply not available because it was not retained.'83
My follow-up email request received the following response, which I
quote in full:
Joelle Moreno,
As we use many different resources to compile street terms for our
database: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/streetterms/default.asp,
we are not able to provide you with a listing of all of our sources.
Included below are reports and resources which we often gather street
terms from. Please let us know if you have any other questions.
Community Epidemiology Work Group (CEWG) reports, National
Institute on Drug Abuse: http://www.nida.nih.gov/about/organization/
CEWG/reports.html Pulse Check reports, Office of National Drug
Control Policy: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/
pulsecheck.html National Drug Intelligence Center: http://www.usdoj.
gov/ndic/ Drug Enforcement Administration: http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/
Information is also gathered from State and local police and health
departments.
Thank you,
180. See Street Terms: Drugs and the Drug Trade, at http://www.whitehousedrug
policy.gov/street terms (last visited Oct. 14, 2004) [hereinafter Street Terms].
181. See id.
182. Telephone Interview with Jennifer Lloyd, President's Office of National Drug
Policy (Feb. 9, 2004).
183. Id.
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Jennifer Lloyd
ONDCP Drug Policy Information Clearinghouse 1-800-666-3332
www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov."
Although each of these links offers drug-related information, none of
the referenced websites provide any information about any source of
the 2300 listed drug jargon definitions. Thus, what purports to be a
definitive dictionary promulgated by the Executive Office of the
President of the United States is likely nothing more than a constantly
expanding list of otherwise common words and slang that, one can
only presume, at least once, some unidentified individual decided had
an independent drug-related meaning.
Assessing expertise is especially difficult because drug jargon
identification is not a real field of study. It does not have any
identifiable methods or standards and lacks any objective criteria that
might be characterized as "intellectual rigor."'' 5 There is no indication
in any related literature that there has ever been a real effort to study or
test the reliability of any drug jargon definitions.' 6 This would not be
impossible.8 For example, empirical research could be used to
ascertain whether drug jargon definitions are accurate and current.
Research could shed light on whether words have a drug-related
meaning only within certain cultures or among people who speak a
particular language. In fact, the only research of drug jargon that I was
able to discover was a single study demonstrating that drug jargon has
clear geographic boundaries.' Obviously, there is no incentive for law
184. E-mail from Jennifer Lloyd, President's Office of National Drug Policy, to Jodlle
Anne Moreno, Associate Professor of Law, New England School of Law (copy on file with
author).
185. The Office of National Drug Control Policy website specifically states that, with
respect to their lists of definitions, "[n]o attempt was made to determine which usage is most
frequent or widespread." Street Terms, supra note 180.
186. The Fifth Circuit recently recognized this ever-expanding list, finding that "[just
as the Eskimos reputedly have 22 different words for snow, we now have, by one count, 223
terms for marijuana." United States v. Griffith, 118 E3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations
omitted).
187. In this way drug jargon expertise is similar to other suspect types of forensic
evidence. "[N]early all the forensic identification 'sciences' based on subjective human
evaluation, such as bitemark, toolmark, and handwriting identification analysis" lack a clear
objective index of mistaken results. Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 177, at 57. The
problem is that fields that lack an "objective index of mistakes" cannot engage in testing that
is "properly designed and administered according to the normal standards of science." Id. at
58.
188. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Ouellet, Henry H. Cagle & Dennis G. Fisher, "Creck"
Versus 'Rock" Cocaine: The Importance of Local Nomenclature in Drug Research and
Education, 24 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS. 219 (1997) (presenting study results demonstrating
significant geographic distinctions in drug-related terminology).
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enforcement to participate in any empirical research that would
establish standards enabling defense attorneys to limit prosecutors'
access to drug jargon expertise.
The problem with the lack of objective data is that it prevents
judges from measuring the reliability of this evidence pretrial and,
once admitted, prevents jurors from gauging its weight. As Professor
Dale A. Nance has suggested, when data regarding reliability does not
exist, it precludes the judge from
requir[ing] an expert, whenever practicable, to frame testimony in a way
that effectively communicates a likelihood ratio for the case-specific
facts to which the expert's explanatory theory applies. If the data are
not available that would allow quantitative or even qualitative measures
of the likelihood ratio, then the expert, again to the extent practicable,
should be limited to providing specialized information that the jury can
use to reach its own, typically intuitive sense of the likelihood ratio.8 9
In the context of drug jargon interpretation, judges and juries cannot
measure the probability that expert testimony is reliable by comparison
to a professional standard or empirical evidence. The judge or jury is
barred by the lack of data from even these intuitive assessments of
reliability. This can be further complicated when the opinion and the
underlying data come from the same source.
D Problems Created When the Investigating Officer Testifies as an
Expert
Various problems arise when the prosecution's expert is also the
investigating officer and testifies as both an expert and a witness of
fact.190
While it is not improper for the government to elicit expert witness
opinion testimony from law enforcement officers who also testified as
fact witnesses because they were the arresting or investigating officer, it
is preferable to garner the expert testimony from an officer who is
removed from direct involvement with the facts of the case. This
preference maintains the fiction that the expert's testimony is that of a
neutral observer who is not commenting on the behavior of any
particular individual, specifically this defendant, but is simply
189. Nance, supa note 177, at 243 (footnote omitted).
190. It is generally considered to be acceptable to use the same witness as an expert
and a witness of fact. See, e.g., United States v. Matos, 905 E2d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 1990) (noting
that in a narcotics prosecution where the case agent interpreted the meaning of records seized
from the defendant, it is not "improper to elicit expert testimony from an officer who is a fact
witness").
2004]
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describing what her years of experience have led her to believe to be
true of certain observed behaviors.'9 '
The problem with having police officers and federal agents serve this
dual function is that it becomes difficult for jurors to keep the roles
separate. There is a built-in incentive for experts to conform facts to
opinions and opinions to facts. There is also a danger that the
imprimatur of expertise accorded the opinion testimony can unfairly
prejudice the defendant by adding an unwarranted patina of reliability
to the witness's fact testimony. The jury may also be misled or
confused. 92 Some of these problems have been specifically discussed
by reviewing courts.
1. Unfair Prejudice
The problem of unfair prejudice was recently addressed by the
Seventh Circuit in United States v Mansool:' 9  The defense had
objected at trial to the prosecution's gang expert's testimony opining
that defendants were involved in a unitary conspiracy to distribute
cocaine and heroin.'94 The defendants argued that because of Officer
Cronin's "dual role as both a fact and an opinion witness[,] ... the jury
may have failed to appreciate when Cronin was testifying to facts
based on his personal knowledge and when he was merely offering his
opinion, and consequently may have given his opinions undue
weight."' 95 The appellate court specifically acknowledged that "there
is a greater danger of undue prejudice to the defendants when a
witness testifies as both an expert and a fact witness. ' 96 However, in
this case the court found "no real possibility that the jury may have
been led to mistakenly credit Cronin's opinions as facts."'
197
191. Hassin, supra note 22, at 673-74 (footnote omitted).
192. This could violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403, which excludes relevant
evidence when "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of... confusion
of the issues, or misleading the jury." FED. R. EvlD. 403; FAIGMAN, KAYE, SAKS & SANDERS,
supra note 165, at 59-60 (noting that judges might find expert evidence to be "not valid
enough" as compared to the dangers created by its use); see Hassin, supra, note 22, at 674-75
(observing that the problem is that "the jury, as the trier of fact, must discern between the
officer's dual roles, as fact witness and as expert witness, in determining how much weight to
accord to her testimony, needlessly adding a layer of potential confusion to the process").
193. 304 E3d 635 (7th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom. Cox v. United States, 538 U.S.
967 (2003).
194. Id at 653.
195. Id
196. Id. at 654.
197. Id. at 654-55.
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In a very recent case, United States v PJvera-Rosario, the
defendant challenged the admission of fact and expert testimony from
a DEA agent who was the case agent in charge of the defendants'
investigation.' The defense argued that the witness's dual role
necessarily prejudiced the defendants by creating "the false impression
that the agent's opinion regarding the criminal nature of the
defendants' coded language was based on his investigation of the
defendants, rather than on generalizations from other experiences."'99
This argument was rejected by the First Circuit, which held that
allowing the agent to testify as both fact witness and expert was not200
error. According to the court, the jury should have understood that
the expert interpretation of coded language was based on the DEA
agent's previous experience.2°1
As these cases illustrate, the federal courts consistently reject
defense challenges based on the inherent prejudice or confusion that
arises when jurors hear fact and opinion testimony from the same
witness."" Outside the federal courts, the only jurisdiction to adopt a
per se ban on allowing law enforcement witnesses to testify as both
expert and lay witnesses was the District of Columbia.0 3 However, the
D.C. courts abandoned this position seven years ago in favor of a more
flexible rule allowing trial courts to decide whether "the danger of jury
confusion can be neutralized by lesser measures than exclusion of dual
testimony altogether."2°4
Only if the defense can construct a fact-specific argument that the
police officer is acting as Christian de Neuville in place of a much less
198. 300F.3d 1, 16-17 (lst Cir. 2002).
199. Id at 17.
200. Id at 17-18.
201. Id.
202. See, e.g, United States v. Liddell, No. 01-2310, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 10433, at
* 11 (6th Cir. May 22, 2003) (holding that there is no per se rule against police officer
testifying as both witness of fact and expert), cert. denied sub nom. Thompson v. United
States, 124 S. Ct. 414 (2003); United States v. Tocco, 200 E3d 401, 418-19 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding no abuse of discretion when a case agent testified as both fact witness and organized
crime expert), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 926 (2003); United States v. Lightfoot, 224 E3d 586,
588-89 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding no error when the trial court allowed a police officer to testify
as a fact and an expert witness); United States v. Young, 745 E2d 733, 760 (2d Cir. 1984)
(finding no error when federal agents were permitted to testify as witnesses of fact and to
opine that intercepted telephone conversations contained coded plans for drug transactions).
203. Beach v. United States, 466 A.2d 862, 864-65 (D.C. 1983) (holding that the same
witness could not testify to both the factual circumstances surrounding the defendant's arrest
and then opine about what would constitute a "useable" amount of narcotics).
204. Eason v. United States, 704 A.2d 284, 285 (D.C. 1997). The court held that a
detective could testify to matters he observed as an eyewitness at the scene of the shooting
and also provide expert testimony interpreting blood spatter evidence. See id. at 284 n.2.
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appealing Cyrano de Bergerac, would expert testimony be rejected
because it is unfairly prejudicial. In United States v Rollins, the
Seventh Circuit noted that if the defense could establish that the
prosecutor sought to use an FBI agent drug jargon expert as a
"mouthpiece" for a cooperating witness who would have provided the
same evidence (but would not have been perceived as credible), the
law enforcement expert testimony should be excluded."5
2. Juror Confusion
The problem of juror confusion was discussed by the Seventh
Circuit in United States v. de Soto2 6 The court noted that when a
police officer is called to testify both as an eyewitness and an expert in
drug dealer methodology, it creates a situation where "these two roles
are intertwined, [and] the possibility of juror confusion is increased.,
207
The court cautioned that "the district court must be especially vigilant
in ensuring that a law enforcement expert's testimony does not unfairly
prejudice the defendant or usurp the jury's function.", °8 According to
the Seventh Circuit, the risk of juror confusion requires that courts
ensure that "the expert must not base his opinion on mere speculation;
nor can he speak, as an expert, to matters that the jury can evaluate for
itself
209
IV DIRTY HARRY ON THE STAND: JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT OF THE
EXPERT AT TRIAL
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and the relevant cases are clear that
the obligations of judicial oversight of expert testimony do not end
with the decision to allow the expert to testify. Simply because an
expert has been qualified does not mean that her testimony should be
unconstrained. A brief review of recent police expert cases serves two
purposes. First, these cases may indicate incipient judicial discomfort
with boundless opinions and speculations from law enforcement
experts. This can be inferred from the fact that in each of these cases,
despite a finding of harmless error, the appellate court reached out to
205. 862 E2d 1282, 1293 (7th Cir. 1988) (concluding that this was not the
government's intent in this case).
206. 885 E2d 354, 359-62 (7th Cir. 1989).
207. Id at 360.
208. Id at 361.
209. Id at 361-62. Despite this strong cautionary language, the DeSoto court found
that admission of both eyewitness fact testimony and expert testimony on drug dealer
methodology from the same police witness was not error by the trial court. Id
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specifically criticize the admission of improper expert testimony.
Second, these cases could be used prospectively by litigants or
commentators to anticipate and advocate appropriate limits on expert
testimony based on both relevance and reliability concerns.
A. Creating Limits Based on the Speculative Nature of the Opinion
United States v Williams deserves serious attention because it
presents a rare example of thoughtful appellate review of appropriate
limits on the scope of police expert testimony.210 Williams was
convicted of possession of a firearm and ammunition, based in part on
the trial testimony of Officers Duncan and Reid of the District of
Columbia Metropolitan Police Department.21' According to the police
officers, on August 1, 1998, at approximately 1:30 am, they stopped
the car in which Williams was a passenger for a minor traffic
• . 212
violation. The officers testified that Williams got out of the car,
reached for his waistband, and was holding something that they
believed might have been a weapon.213 When Williams began to run,
Officer Duncan chased him, while Officer Reid remained with the
driver.214  Officer Duncan never saw Williams holding a gun or
discarding a gun, and when Williams was apprehended shortly
thereafter, no gun was discovered.25 However, a gun was discovered
during a search of the area.216 At trial, during a lengthy redirect
examination of Officer Duncan, the prosecutor was permitted to ask
the following question: "In your experience as a patrol officer, is it
common for people who use drugs or sell drugs to carry weapons for
protection?"'2 7 Officer Duncan responded affirmatively.2 8 Despite the
prosecutor's elicitation of this unsupported opinion testimony, the
judge denied defense counsel's request to recross-examine the
witness." 9
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit focused on the admission of Officer
Duncan's opinion testimony that drug users commonly "carry weapons
210. 212 E3d 1305 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
211. Id. at 1306-07.
212. Id. at 1307.
213. Id.
214. Id
215. Id.
216. Id
217. Id. at 1308.
218. Id.
219. Id
TULANE LA W REVIEW
for protection. " ' Judge Henderson, writing for the majority, noted
that while "the inquiry regarding Duncan's experience with drug
dealers commonly carrying weapons for protection raises no
eyebrows, we cannot say the same regarding drug users."22 ' Because
the appellate court decided that the link between drug use and gun
possession was "tenuous," further exploration of the foundation of
Officer Duncan's testimony was required.21 Judge Henderson began
by noting that Officer Duncan had very limited experience with
arresting suspects who were in possession of firearms (fewer than one
dozen arrests).223 In addition, there was no evidence offered to
establish that any of these arrests involved drug users. 24 According to
the court, this would preclude qualification of Officer Duncan as an
expert under Rule 702.5 In addition, even if this were viewed as lay
opinion testimony under Rule 701, there was no evidence that Officer
Duncan's opinion "was rationally based on his own perceptions
26
because the witness "did not establish a factual basis for credible
opinion testimony regarding the likelihood of drug users being
armed.
227
B. Creating Limts Based on UnwarmntedExtrapolations
If law enforcement experts are barred from speculating, they
should also be precluded from drawing inferences that are unwarranted
by the evidence they have been asked to interpret. In United States v
Theodoropoulos, eight defendants were convicted of conspiracy to
distribute cocaine.2 8 At trial, a prosecution expert FBI agent identified
and translated coded language contained in numerous intercepted
conversations.1 This expert testimony included informing the jury
that defendants' conversational references to "clothes, steaks,
televisions, furniture, cars, and statues" should be understood as
references to narcotics. 20 However, the FBI agent's testimony was not
limited to providing drug jargon interpretations. Agent Eberhart was
220. Id. at 1309.
221. Id. (citation omitted).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id
225. Id
226. Id. at 1309-10.
227. Id. at 1310. The error was deemed harmless. Id at 1310-12.
228. 866 E2d 587, 588 (3d Cir. 1989), overruled on other grounds byUnited States v.
Price, 76 E3d 526, 528 (3d Cir. 1996).
229. Id. at 589.
230. Id.
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also permitted to testify, over defense objection, to the nature of
defendants' drug trafficking business and the specific role of each
defendant in the criminal enterprise.231 In reviewing the admission of
this testimony, the court specifically recognized the risk that
"permitting an expert to testify concerning a defendant's role in a drug
operation may ... be overly persuasive to the jury."'232 This risk was
created by the fact that there is an "aura of special reliability and
trustworthiness surrounding expert testimony. '  Thus, according to
the Third Circuit inferences and conclusions that are unwarranted by
the factual evidence "should not be routinely admitted.
23 4
C Creating Limits Based on Conclusions ofIlegality
Judges should also carefully limit law enforcement expert
opinions that contain conclusions about the illegality of the defendant's
behavior.235 In United States v Boissoneaul, the prosecutor relied on
testimony from a DEA agent concluding that certain numbers and
initials found on a piece of paper seized from the defendant indicated
"street level distribution of cocaine." '236 In reviewing the admission of
this opinion testimony, the Second Circuit noted that Rule 702 is
"liberal" in that "a qualified expert may generally suggest inferences
that should be drawn from the facts. 2 7 However, the court found the
opinion testimony in this case "troublesome."238 The appellate court
was especially concerned about admission of "Agent Sullivan's three
conclusory statements that the totality of the physical evidence in the
case suggested 'street level distribution of cocaine.' 2 9 According to
the Second Circuit, "[w]e have repeatedly expressed our discomfort
with expert testimony in narcotics cases that not only describes the
significance of certain conduct or physical evidence in general, but
231. Id
232. Id. at 592.
233. Id (quotations omitted).
234. Id.
235. The specific problems that arise when police officers testify to their opinion as to
whether a driver is operating under the influence of narcotics is given thoughtful and
extensive review in David Sandier, Expert and Opinion Testimony of Law Enforcement
Officers Regarding Identification of Drug Impaired Dnvers, 23 U. HAw. L. REv. 151 (2000).
This article explains how DUI suspects whose alcohol readings are below the legal limit are
now far more likely to be subjected to the assessment of a "drug recognition expert" police
officer. Id. at 153.
236. 926 E2d 230, 231-32 (2d Cir. 1991).
237. Id. at 232.
238. Id. at 233.
239. Id
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also draws conclusions as to the significance of that conduct or
evidence in the particular case. 2 40  Problems arise when "a
Government expert's personal opinion that ambiguous conduct
constitutes criminal activity, given its inherently speculative nature,
holds only slight probative value. 24' According to the appellate court,
the better solution would have been for the trial court to allow Agent
Sullivan to testify only to the likely drug transaction-related
significance of the physical evidence because "the jury was competent
to draw its own conclusion as to Boissoneault's involvement in the
distribution of cocaine. 242
The Boissoneault case echoes an earlier decision by the Second
Circuit. In United States v Young, Judge Jon Newman, in a
concurring opinion, expressed "caution concerning expert opinion
offered to establish that ambiguous conduct constitutes criminal
activity."
243
Whatever slight probative value arises from a narcotics expert's
personal opinion that an observed transaction involved a sale of drugs
must be carefully weighed against the distinct risk of prejudice. The
aura of special reliability and trustworthiness surrounding expert
testimony which ought to caution its use, especially when offered by the
prosecution in criminal cases, poses a special risk in a case of this sort.
That risk arises because the jury may infer that the agent's opinion
about the criminal nature of the defendant's activity is based on
knowledge of the defendant beyond the evidence at triali 44
According to Judge Newman, "[t]he risk [of prejudice] is increased
when the opinion is given by 'the very officers who were in charge of
the investigation.
'
'
2 45
D Creating Linmts Based on the Relaftonship Between Drug Jargon
Expert Testimony and Propensity Evidence
The potential connection between propensity evidence and drug
jargon testimony raises two unexplored and interesting questions.
First, does the routine admission of police expert testimony provide
prosecutors with an end run around the general ban on propensity
240. Id.
241. Id. at 234 (citing United States v. Young, 745 E2d 733, 765-66 (2d Cir. 1984)
(Newman, J., concurring)).
242. ld at 233.
243. 745 E2d 733, 765 (2d Cir. 1984) (Newman, J., concurring).
244. Id. at 765-66 (Newman, J., concurring) (citations and quotations omitted).
245. Id at 766 (Newman, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. Sette, 334 E2d 267,
269 (2d Cir. 1964)).
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evidence contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)?2 46 Second, if
the prosecutor is permitted to introduce drug jargon expert testimony,
and the defendant responds by arguing that he was not using drug
jargon, can the government seek to introduce the defendant's otherwise
inadmissible prior drug convictions under Federal Rule of Evidence
404(b) to rebut this defense?
247
1. Is Expert Testimony that the Defendant Understands and Uses
Drug Jargon the Functional Equivalent of Propensity Evidence?
Drug jargon expert evidence arguably violates the general rule
against propensity evidence if jurors conclude that the defendant must
have learned drug jargon while committing prior crimes or bad acts.
Judges should exclude this "bad character" evidence if it could lead a
jury to convict the defendant either because jurors assume that
defendant is a criminal or even if jurors fail to find that the prosecutor
has met her burden of proof in this case. Because the nature of the
current and prior crimes and bad acts is similar, the danger of unfair
prejudice to the defendant is increased.
The problem with propensity evidence is not that the defendant's
past is wholly irrelevant. It is "the remoteness and indeterminancy of
the inference, the small weight to be assigned to it, its potential
overvaluation, and in many instances, its potential for inflammation or
inducement of practical reduction in the applied standard of proof.
248
In 1997, in Old Chief v United States, the Supreme Court
reaffirmed the importance of the propensity evidence ban. According
to the Court, "[t]he term 'unfair prejudice,' as to a criminal defendant,
speaks to the capacity of some concededly relevant evidence to lure the
factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different from proof
specific to the offense charged.' 249 The Court also focused on the
dangers of jurors "generalizing a defendant's earlier bad act into bad
character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad
act now charged (or, worse, as calling for preventive conviction even if
246. "Evidence of a person's character or a trait of character is not admissible for the
purpose of proving action in conformity therewith on a particular occasion ...." FED. R.
EVID. 404(a).
247. The argument would most frequently be made based on the prosecutor's effort to
establish the defendant's "knowledge" or "intent" under Rule 404(b) or the state equivalent.
248. D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hal, Modus
Operandi and "Offender Profiling" Some Lessons ofModem Cognftive Science for the Law
ofE'dence, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 193, 205 (2002).
249. 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997).
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he should happen to be innocent momentarily).""2 ' Thus, according to
the Court "[a]lthough... 'propensity evidence' is relevant, the risk that
a jury will convict for crimes other than those charged-or that,
uncertain of guilt, it will convict anyway because a bad person
deserves punishment-creates a prejudicial effect that outweighs
ordinary relevance."25'
Defense attorneys who fail to raise propensity objections make a
strategic mistake.252 There are at least two possible advantages to this
argument. First, if the defense objects to drug jargon expert testimony
as character evidence, the prosecutor may respond by arguing that
jurors will not necessarily make the unfairly prejudicial inference that
the defendant learned drug jargon while committing other prior crimes
and bad acts. Implicit in this argument is the assumption that drug
language is accessible to those outside the drug trafficking community.
The defense can now turn the prosecutor's own argument against her.
If drug terminology has entered the vernacular and can be understood
by those not in the drug trade, there is little or no reason for expert
drug jargon testimony, especially when balanced against the substantial
risk of unfair prejudice to the defendant. Second, even if the
propensity argument is not persuasive, the defense has laid the
groundwork for clear limiting instructions.
2. Does a Defendant's Objection to Drug Jargon Expertise Open the
Door to Admission of His Prior Convictions Under Rule 404(b)?
This bizarre twist on the propensity question was recently
addressed for the first time by the Second Circuit in United States v
Garcia.253 In Garcia, the defendants were charged with possession with
intent to distribute cocaine. The trial court permitted a cooperating
witness to offer opinion testimony that a taped conversation that he had
with one of the defendants was a coded arrangement for a drug sale.255
250. Id. at 180-81.
251. Id. at 181 (internal quotations omitted).
252. I was unable to discover any reported cases where this argument has been
advanced. It seems likely that defense attorneys hesitate to raise this objection either because
the prosecutor has not sought to introduce specific evidence of prior crimes or bad acts or
because they anticipate that the evidence will inevitably be admitted under one of the many
exceptions contained in Rule 404(b). Under Rule 404(b), "Evidence of other crimes, wrongs,
or acts ... may ... be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident... " FED. R.
EVID. 404(b).
253. 291 E3d 127 (2d Cir. 2002).
254. Id at 130.
255. Id. at 132, 134.
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Although Garcia did not testify, the prosecutor was also permitted to
introduce, over defense objection, Garcia's twelve-year-old conviction
for cocaine possession under Rule 404(b).256 The district court
reasoned that "the prior conviction was admissible as a similar act to
show knowledge and intent of the allegedly coded language Garcia
used to negotiate the instant drug deal. '"257  On appeal, the court
explored whether the defense argument that Garcia had not used drug
jargon should have opened the door to his otherwise inadmissible prior
criminal history under Rule 404(b).250
The Second Circuit refused to find that Rule 404(b) enables
prosecutors to admit prior narcotics convictions against defendants
who object to prosecution drug jargon experts. 259 According to the
court, only relevant past convictions could have been used to prove a
defendant's knowledge or intent in the current case.2 60 The prosecutor
had failed to show that the defendant's prior conviction was relevant to
the question of defendant's knowledge of drug jargon.26' According to
the court:
The government may not invoke Rule 404(b) and proceed to offer, carte
blanche, any prior act of the defendant in the same category of crime.
The government must identify a similarity or connection between the
two acts that makes the prior act relevant to establishing knowledge of
the current act.262
The court noted various factors that indicated that the prior conviction
was not relevant, such as (1) the long period of time between the two
crimes, (2) the very different quantity of drugs involved, (3) the
different people involved, and (4) the lack of evidence that the earlier
case involved the use of drug jargon made defendant's prior conviction
inadmissible.2 " Although defense attorneys should anticipate that
prosecutors will seek to take advantage of Rule 404(b) in this way, the
Garcia case suggests that it should generally be excluded.2 6
256. Id. at 134-35.
257. Id. at 135.
258. Id. at 135-39.
259. Id at 137.
260. Id.
261. Id at 138.
262. Id. at 137.
263. Id. at 138-39.
264. Id. (finding that "the risk of prejudice arising from the admission of the prior
conviction clearly substantially outweigh[s] any marginal probative value of the evidence").
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V CONCLUSION: Do WE NEED MULTIPLE STANDARDS, DIFFERENT
STANDARDS, ORA BETTER APPLICATION OF THE EXISTING
STANDARD?
Over the past few years we have learned a great deal about how
expert witnesses are used in criminal cases. We know that prosecutors'
experts are much more likely to be admitted than those offered by the
defense."' We know that law enforcement officers are the most
common prosecution experts.266 We also know that police officers and
federal agents are most frequently called to testify in narcotics cases
where their testimony "typically concem[s] [the] officers' observations
of drug dealing activities. " '
The cases supply the details that are missing from the empirical
evidence. They show us how and why judges consistently fail to
exclude or limit police officer expert testimony in narcotics cases, even
when this testimony falls short of admissibility standards or conflicts
with other rules. Given the current state of the law, we have two
options for avoiding the mistakes of the past and crafting a better
approach. We could speculate about multiple evidentiary standards
that would vary depending on the nature of the case and the identity of
the party. The alternative is to work to ensure that the current one-size-
fits-all rules of evidence are equitably applied to all litigants in all
cases.
A. MultipleAdmissibility Standards
The possibility of alternative admissibility standards has been
suggested in various forms. 6 Professor Christopher Slobogin has
argued that in criminal cases different standards should be applied to
experts for the prosecution and defense. Professor Slobogin believes
that Daubert created a "positivist" reliability standard that will
inevitably be much more difficult for defense experts to satisfy.269
According to Professor Slobogin:
265. See supm Part I.C (discussing recent empirical evidence that details how expert
testimony is used in state and federal criminal prosecutions).
266. SeesupmPartI.C.
267. Groscup et al., supra note 6, at 345; see supra Part I.C.
268. See, e.g., Crump, supra note 166, at 40-41 (referring to the standards created in
Daubert and Kumho Tire as "illfitting and wrong" and suggesting that the Court should have
limited itself to a "call for appropriate validation" instead of entering into "uncharted
territory").
269. See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 108-09.
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In the long run, however, the likelihood is high that criminal defendants
will suffer much more than the state if Daubert is taken seriously. That
is because prosecutors and defense attorneys need different types of
experts to make their cases-in-chief The prosecution uses experts
primarily to support assertions about physical facts.... In contrast, the
defense's affirmative case is most likely to involve claims about the
defendant's mental state at the time of the offense .... 270.
The difference between experts for the different sides is significant,
according to Professor Slobogin, because "assertions about physical
facts are eminently more verifiable than assertions about past mental
state." '271 In response, Professor Slobogin offers a very specific
solution.
As Professor Slobogin envisions the admissibility standard,
"reliability is not necessarily sacrificed [in criminal cases] when the
defense is permitted to use evidence that fails the positivist threshold
dictated by Daubet.'272  This means that "concerns about process
should trump concerns about reliability" '273 and "very few limitations
should be placed on defense expertise. , 71 Professor Slobogin suggests
that this standard would allow judges to admit a defense theory (even
if it has not been verified) if it is "considered plausible among the
relevant professionals." '275 Judges should also admit expert opinion
about a defendant's mental state as long as the expert used "accepted
evaluation protocols." '276 This proposal raises questions about both the
likelihood and feasibility of multiple admissibility standards.
1. The Creation of a Lower Admissibility Standard for Expert
Evidence Offered by Criminal Defendants Is Unlikely
The Supreme Court has addressed the question of a more relaxed
reliability standard for criminal defendants in the post-Daubert decade
and answered it with a resounding "no."
United States v Scheffer provides little hope for advocates of
multiple admissibility standards.277 This case involved Edward
270. Id.
271. Id. at 110.
272. Id. at 119.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 124.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. 523 U.S. 303, 312 (1998) (advocating a per se rule excluding all polygraph
evidence in military courts). Professor Paul C. Giannelli discusses Scheffer, but from a
different perspective. See Giannelli, supra note 65, at 1092-96. Professor Giannelli contrasts
the per se ban of polygraph evidence in military courts upheld by the Scheffer Court to the
2004]
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Scheffer, who was working as an informant for the Air Force Office of
Special Investigations (OSI)7' As a condition of his employment,
Scheffer was required to provide urine samples and submit to
polygraph examinations.279 In April 1992, the OSI requested a urine
sample and a few days later Scheffer submitted to a polygraph
examination.' According to the polygraph examiner, "the test
'indicated no deception' when [Scheffer] denied using drugs since
joining the Air Force.'" 28  Scheffer was arrested on May 13, 1992, for
being absent without leave. In April 1992, his urine sample tested
positive for methamphetamine.282
Scheffer was tried by general court martial 3.2  At this proceeding,
he was barred from introducing the results of his polygraph
examination by Military Rule of Evidence 707 (MRE 707), which
contains a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence in military court
martial proceedings. 284  Basing his defense on a theory of innocent
ingestion, Scheffer denied knowingly ingesting methamphetamine
while working for the OSI.2 On cross-examination, the prosecutor
286impeached Scheffer with prior inconsistent statements. During
closing argument, the prosecutor stated, "He lies. He is a liar. He lies
at every opportunity he gets and he has no credibility. 28 7 Scheffer was
convicted and sentenced to thirty months of confinement, a bad-
conduct discharge, total forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade.8 On appeal, the Court of
type of reliability standard for polygraphs that currently exists in the federal courts, noting
with irony that the military both sponsors research on polygraphs and regularly employs this
technique. Id. at 1092-94. He also critiques the Supreme Court's concerns that expert
polygraph evidence would either impair the jurors' abilities to assess the defendant's
credibility or prolong the trial based on a collateral issue. Id at 1094-95.
278. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305.
279. See id.
280. Id. at 306.
281. Id.
282. Id at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
283. Id. at 306.
284. See id. at 306-07.
285. Id (providing the relevant portion of MRE 707).
286. Id. at 306 n.1.
287. United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442, 443 (C.A.A.E 1996), rev 523 U.S. 303
(1998); see Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 306 (explaining that Scheffer sought to introduce the
polygraph evidence to corroborate his belief that he had not ingested methamphetamine); see
also Robin D. Barovick, Between Rock and a Hard Place: Polygraph Prejudice Persists After
Scheffer, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 1533, 1547 n.66 (1999) (noting that the government called
Scheffer a liar or stated that his credibility was lacking twenty-one times during closing
argument).
288. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 307.
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Appeals for the Armed Forces found MRE 707 unconstitutional. 9
The appellate court reasoned that a criminal defendant was uniquely
harmed by a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence because it
prevented him from exercising his Sixth Amendment right to respond
to a direct attack on his credibility.'9°
Justice Thomas drafted the plurality opinion for the Supreme
Court.'9' Not only was the Court reluctant to recognize that criminal
defendants may be prejudiced by stringent admissibility standards, but
the Court found that "Rule 707 does not implicate any significant
interest of the accused."2 92  Justice Thomas reasoned that because
Scheffer had not been prevented from testifying in his own defense, he
was "barred merely from introducing expert opinion testimony to
bolster his own credibility.
2 93
Justice Stevens directed his vigorous dissent at the dangers of
excluding exculpatory expert evidence offered by a criminal
defendant, providing a glimpse of how a different Supreme Court
might respond.9  He began by admonishing the Court for "barely
acknowledg[ing] that a person accused of a crime has a constitutional
right to present a defense. 295 According to Justice Stevens, "[s]tate
evidentiary rules may so seriously impede the discovery of truth, as
well as the doing of justice, that they preclude the meaningful
opportunity to present a complete defense that is guaranteed by the
Constitution., 296 The problem was that the plurality "all but ignore[d]
the strength of the defendant's interest in having polygraph evidence
admitted.' 297 Justice Stevens asserted that the Court's assumption that
the defendant is not significantly harmed by the exclusion of this
expert testimony, because he is not barred from testifying himself, is
the equivalent of stating that "a rule that excluded the testimony of
alibi witnesses would not be significant as long as the defendant is free
to testify himself."'298 According to Justice Stevens, the majority had
failed to recognize that a per se ban on a defendant's expert testimony
289. Scheffer, 44 MJ. at 445 (holding that a per se exclusion of polygraph evidence
violated the Sixth Amendment rights of an accused when the evidence was offered to rebut an
attack on his credibility).
290. Id
291. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 305.
292. Id. at 316-17.
293. Id. at 317.
294. See id. at 320-39 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
295. Id. at 325-26 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
296. Id. at 329 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
297. Id at 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
298. Id (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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has a potentially debilitating impact on his Sixth Amendment rights
because it "unquestionably impairs any meaningful opportunity to
present a complete defense.
2 99
2. Admissibility Standards that Vary Depending on the Case and
Party Would Create New Problems for the Courts
Scheffer clearly suggests that the Supreme Court would reject a
more permissive expert admissibility standard for criminal defendants
based on the Sixth Amendment.300 If the right to a lower standard
cannot be rooted in the criminal defendant's trial rights, perhaps it can
be derived from the nature of the defendant's evidence?
This is roughly the argument advanced by Professor Christopher
M. Slobogin. He suggests that most prosecution expert testimony, but
not defense expert testimony, relates to physical evidence.0 ' This
makes the prosecutor's expert evidence amenable to the more stringent
Daubert reliability standard. Assuming that Professor Slobogin's
statistical assumptions are empirically sound, linking the standard to
the nature of the evidence raises more questions than it answers.
For example, what standard should apply when a prosecutor
seeks to introduce expert evidence (such as drug jargon testimony) that
relates not to physical evidence, but to a defendant's mental state? To
be consistent with Professor Slobogin's premise, the nature of the
evidence should be determinative. Because this evidence is more
similar to other mental state evidence than to physical evidence,
prosecutors should also be able to avail themselves of a lower
admissibility standard. A similar problem would arise whenever
defense attorneys sought to use experts to rebut or suggest inferences
from any physical evidence. Under this system, different types of
experts for both sides will be subject to different standards. This
outcome seems both untenable and undesirable.0 2
299. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
300. Seeidat317.
301. See Slobogin, supra note 4, at 110 (suggesting that prosecutors rely primarily on
expert testimony regarding physical evidence).
302. I am not suggesting that this outcome would be acceptable to Professor Slobogin.
Although the article does not address the question of which test should be applied to mental
state evidence offered by the prosecution, he does note that "it would not be inconsistent with
this position to require that identification expertise offered by the prosecution satisfy the latter
[Dauber] test." Id. at 125. It is not clear whether Professor Slobogin intends "identification
expertise" to be limited to physical evidence or whether it might include testimony such as
drug jargon expertise.
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B. DifferentAdmissibility Standards
1. Reliability Normed in Law, Not in the Expert's Discipline
A different, but eqially problematic alternative would be to create
reliability standards that are unhitched from the dictates of the relevant
discipline. For example, the quest for a better reliability standards has
lead Professor Dale A. Nance to suggest that the Supreme Court meant
something very different by "reliability" in Daubert and Kumho Tire
than we have always assumed. According to Professor Nance, Daubert
initially left open the question of whether a finding of scientific
reliability was intended to be determinative or simply useful to the
reviewing court, but this ambiguity was resolved by the Kumho Tire
Court.
303
Professor Nance posits that because Kumho Tire required only
that judges "consider the specific factors identified in Daubert where
they are reasonable measures of the reliability of the expert
testimony"'3 °4 this "frees Daubert to allow that there is an important
analytical difference, even in the context of scientific evidence,
between legal norms of reliability and norms of validity or reliability
that inform the inference processes in any non-legal discipline that is
invoked in testimony.''3 °5 Professor Nance's fundamental thesis, that
absolute deference to a concept of reliability grounded in a nonlegal
discipline may be hard for judges to operate, is inarguable. However,
his thesis is not well supported by his argument that Kumho Tire
created a new reliability standard normed in law rather than the
expert's own discipline.
The key, according to Professor Nance, is that the Kumho Tire
Court said that "[a] trial court should consider the specific factors
identified in Daubert where they are reasonable measures of the
reliability of the expert testimony.""3 6 This seems to place far too much
weight on Justice Breyer's use of the word "reasonable" in this context.
The quoted sentence appears at the end of a lengthy discussion by
Justice Breyer approving a Daubert-style reliability analysis rooted not
in legal policy, but in the norms of the relevant science, technology, or
other field of specialized knowledge. According to the Court,
The objective of [Dauberfs gatekeeping requirement] ... is to ensure
the reliability and relevancy of expert testimony. It is to make certain
303. See Nance, suprm note 177, at 208.
304. Id (quoting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999)).
305. Id.
306. Id. (quoting Kunho Tire, 526 U.S. at 152).
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that an expert, whether basing testimony upon professional studies or
personal experience, employs in the courtroom the same level of
intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice of an expert in the
relevant field. Nor do we deny that, as stated in Dauberit the particular
questions that it mentioned will often be appropriate for use in
determining the reliability of challenged expert testimony. Rather, we
conclude that the trial judge must have considerable leeway in deciding
in a particular case how to go about determining whether particular
expert testimony is reliable. That is to say, a trial court should consider
the specific factors identified in Daubert where they are reasonable
measures of the reliability of expert testimony.
0 7
In context, it seems clear that Justice Breyer intends that future judges
will gauge reliability by contrasting the reliability of the proffered
testimony to the norms of reliability that govem practice in this
expert's field. This is the only reading consistent with Justice Breyer's
conclusion that
[Daube] requires a valid ... connection to the pertinent inquiry as a
precondition to admissibility ... [a]nd where such testimony's factual
basis, data, principles, methods, or their application are called
sufficiently into question,... the trial judge must determine whether the
testimony has a reliable basis in the knowledge and experience of the
relevant discipline. °8
Read this way, Kumho Tire supports only the limited conclusion that
judges should be free to decide when and how the four flexible
reliability criteria detailed in Daubert should be applied and does not
convey blanket authority to substitute in legal norms.309 If the Kumho
Tire Court's discussion of judicial flexibility relates only to the means
for testing whether the Daubert standard had been satisfied (not, as
Professor Nance seems to argue, the content of the standard itself),
Kumho Tire provides little support for a reliability standard gauged by
legal reliability, rather than the reliability standards of the relevant
discipline.
2. Reliability as Relevance
Professor David Crump argues that the Supreme Court has an
"unduly cramped" philosophy of science."' The problem with the
307. Kumbo Tire, 526 U.S. at 152.
308. Id. at 149 (citations and internal quotations omitted).
309. See id. at 150-51 ("Daubert makes clear that the factors it mentions do not
constitute a 'definitive checklist or test."').
310. SeeCrump, supmnote 166, at 2.
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current standard, according to Professor Crump, is that it cannot
accommodate the fact that "non-scientific expert evidence ... [is]
different from scientific evidence in ways that would vary from case to
case."3 ' The case law embodies this problematic philosophical view.
Daubertcreated a process that is "lengthy, technical and diffuse" '312 and
Kumho Tire compounded the Court's original mistake by "exten[ding]
... [the Daubert factors] to the extent that they conceivably might
apply, leaving the law in an even more indeterminate state."3 '3
The result is analogous to telling a person unfamiliar with both[,] that a
television set differs from an orange, but that unpredictable
characteristics of one can appropriately be used in treating the other.
The hypothetical listener should be forgiven if she attempts to eat the
television set and watch the orange. That is what has happened in the
cases that have followed Kumho.314
Professor Crump suggests that a better alternative would be "for the
Supreme Court to overrule Daubert-Kumho and return to the
'helpfulness' or 'assist' standard that is embodied in Rule 702."'
Professor Crump argues that returning to Rule 702 would transform
the expert admissibility inquiry into a "relevance-based problem."" 6
Using this standard, courts would exclude or include expert evidence
based on its probative value.
3'1 7
Professor Crump's argument ignores or discounts various critical
facts. First, he fails to even mention the substantial amendments to
Rule 702 that predate publication of his article by more than two years.
Because amendments to Rule 702 are explicitly derived from Daubert
and Kwnho Tire, it is difficult to see how Rule 702 presents a unique
alternative standard. Second, relevance is already a vital component of
the admissibility standard. Expert evidence, like all evidence, must be
relevant under Rule 401.3"8 The Daubeft Court also added its own
independent relevance/fit requirement that must be satisfied."9 Finally,
removing the reliability criteria from the admissibility standard would
resurrect all of the arguments by scholars and litigants that originally
gave rise to Dauberta decade ago.
311. Id. at 41.
312. Id. at 1.
313. Id at 2.
314. Id
315. Id.
316. Id at 41.
317. Id at 2.
318. FED. R. EVD. 401.
319. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).
TULANE LA WREVIEW
C Improving Operation of the ExistingAdmissibility Standard
If multiple or alternative admissibility standards are unlikely or
untenable, that does not mean that the current system cannot be
improved. Rule 702 was recently revamped to provide better guidance
and new cases are decided every day. When experts seek to testify to
matters, such as DNA evidence, that are derived from a scientific field
of well-established validity, the judicial screen for relevance and
reliability should be fairly straightforward. When judges "believe that
information properly generated by the methods required of
practitioners of science by the applicable practice norms of the area in
which they operate has a high claim to reliability, ... [t]hen it is
appropriate to look to that science practice itself for the proper
variables affecting warranted belief for such a claimed product."32° The
more compelling problems arise when the expert evidence cannot be
tested against reliability variables and/or when the field of expertise
itself is suspect.
Judges should be especially concerned when an expert's opinions
are based solely "on his own subjective observations over the course of
his experience, available only to him and in their individual form now
almost certainly only imperfectly recalled, if at all."3 '  Personal
opinion, even when it is based on extensive experience, cannot
establish reliability or provide the foundation for expertise. Judges
applying Rule 702 should exclude experience-based expertise, such as
law enforcement drug jargon testimony, unless the expert can "explain
how that experience leads to the conclusion reached, why that
experience is a sufficient basis for the opinion, and how that
experience is reliably applied to the facts. 322 When these threshold
requirements are ignored, prosecutors can present conjecture and
speculation disguised as expertise, while denying the defense access to
information necessary for effective cross examination. Judges who
fail to screen or limit prosecutors' presentation of police expert
testimony create mini-police states by ceding control over the nature
and quality of the evidence presented in their courtrooms.
320. Denbeaux & Risinger, supra note 177, at 43.
321. Id at52.
322. FED. R. EvID. 702 advisory committee's note.
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